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Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally
Protected Autonomy Right?
Nili Karako-Eyal*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than two decades have passed since the publication
of one of the most salient articles ever written on the subject of
informed consent: “From Informed Consent to Patient Choice:
A New Protected Interest.”1 In this article, Marjorie Shultz,
argued that a patient’s right to autonomy2 should be
© 2009 Nili Karako-Eyal.
* Nili Karako-Eyal, J.S.D., is a Law Lecturer at The College of
Management Academic Studies, Israel. She teaches courses in civil
procedure, tort law, and damages law, and lectures in risk management
courses. She is the director of a patient rights clinic, which is the only
clinic is Israel providing legal assistance for patients. In addition she is
the editor of the legal journal at her law school. Her publications span
issues of informed consent, right to autonomy, and compensation for
damages due to medical expenditures. She received her L.L.B. (with
Honors) from Tel-Aviv University and her J.S.D. from The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem School of Law.
1. Marjorie Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
2. The “patient’s right to autonomy” is a very complex concept.
Although discussion of this term—its origin and meaning—exceeds the
boundaries of this paper, a short clarification and its relation to other
terms, principles and ideas is provided here. The term “patient’s right to
autonomy” refers to the patient’s right to decide whether to undergo the
proposed treatment, choose another treatment or refuse any treatment
whatsoever. This decision should be intentional, freely accepted and
based on relevant information. This right may be confined under special
circumstances, i.e., medical emergency or incompetence. For a discussion
of the conditions for an autonomy decision see, e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & TOM
L. BEUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 238 (1986).
The right to autonomy has several dimensions. First, it expresses
philosophical theories—such as those developed by Kant, Berlin and
Mill—having the principles of autonomy and liberty as their subjects. For
a general description of these theories see, e.g., ALASDAIR MACLEAN
AUTONOMY, INFORMED CONSENT AND MEDICAL LAW–A RATIONAL CHALLENGE
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recognized and respected as a distinct and separate legal
interest.3 Her approach diverged from the prevailing U.S.
position, according to which protection of this interest derived
from defense of the interest in a person’s physical well-being or
physical security.4
Three decisions handed down since that article’s
publication, the first by Australia’s Supreme Court, the second
by the British House of Lords, and the third by Israel’s
Supreme Court—Chappel,5 Chester,6 and Ali Daaka,7
respectively—raise the question of whether Shultz’s approach
has, in fact, been incorporated, either in whole or in part, into
Anglo-America law beyond the United States.8
9–22 (2009). Hence, the right to autonomy has some characteristics in
common with these philosophical theories such as the absence of
controlling influences exercised by others. See ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY
AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 23, 28 (2002). Second, autonomy is a fundamental
principle in medical ethics. It relates to physicians’ ethical obligation to
respect their patients’ wishes and provide assistance in arriving at
autonomous decisions. See TOM L. BEUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 125 (4th ed. 1994). Third, it represents
the rationale behind the legal doctrine of informed consent. According to
this doctrine, adopted by American law in the mid-twentieth century,
informed consent, as a pre-condition for the performance of any medical
treatment, requires the patient to make an autonomous decision as to
whether to undergo treatment. A doctor who treats a patient without
respecting her right to autonomy—that is, without receiving her informed
consent—can be charged with the tort of battery or negligence. See, e.g.,
Maclean, supra note 2, at 190. The term “informed consent” was first used
by an American court. See Salgo v. Stanford, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957)
and is effectively identical to an autonomous decision to undergo medical
treatment. Also related to the informed consent doctrine is the legal term
“dignitary tort.” This term was suggested by legal scholars who believed
that the law should recognize a new tort for the purpose of protecting the
patient’s right to autonomy per se. See infra note 31.
3. See generally Shultz, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 219.
5. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html.
6. Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134 (U.K.).
7. CA 2781/93 Ali Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa [1999] IsrSC 53(4)
526.
8. Israeli law has long since adopted the doctrine of informed
consent as promulgated in Anglo-American law. Like Anglo-American
courts, Israeli courts recognize the duty to obtain a patient’s consent and
to provide her with information. See Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC at 543–52,
564, 589; CA 434/94 Berman v. Moore Inst. for Med. Info., Ltd. [1997]
IsrSC 51(4) 205, 212–14. They also accept the “reasonable patient” test
when establishing the boundaries of the physician’s duty to inform the
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In this article, I argue that although each of the decisions
accords with Shultz’s suggestion that the interest protected in
informed consent cases should be the patient’s right to
autonomy, as distinct from physical well-being or physical
security, none of these decisions fully reflects the position that
a patient’s right to autonomy is a separate interest. Hence,
none of these decisions accepts the idea that interference with
the right to autonomy is in itself a harm that entitles plaintiffs
to compensation. In addition, I argue that the main cause for
American unwillingness and, perhaps, inability to adopt this
idea is rooted in the characteristics of the tort of negligence, a
cause of action available to patients claiming breach of the
duty of disclosure. I further argue that Shultz’s thesis should
be reconsidered. I argue that recognition of the right to
autonomy as a separate interest is insufficient; in its place, the
courts should recognize a new cause of action: interference
with the right to autonomy. In addition, elaboration of this
argument entails analysis of the issue of compensation to be
awarded for interference with the right to autonomy. To
support my argument, I analyze Rees,9 an additional decision
handed down by the British House of Lords.
There are seven parts to this paper. In the first part
(Section II), following the introduction, I present Shultz’s
thesis. The second part (Section III) begins with a description
patient. See Patient’s Rights Act, 1996, S.H. 327. Patients arguing a
breach of the duty of disclosure can claim a cause of action under the tort
of negligence. Patients wishing to claim physical injury suffered as a
result of the medical treatment must prove injury causation and decision
causation. That is, the medical procedure is a “but-for” cause of the
physical injury, and the patient would have refused the proposed
procedure if the relevant information had been disclosed. If, in addition to
that cause of action, a patient wishes to claim that her consent to the
treatment was never given, she can claim a cause of action under the tort
of assault, so long as the respective treatment entailed physical force. See
Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC at 543–52, 564, 589; Berman, [1997] IsrSC at
205, 212–14. In 1996 Israel passed its Patient’s Rights Act, which
anchored the doctrine of informed consent in comprehensive legislation.
Patient’s Rights Act, 1996, S.H. 327. The law introduced no changes in
the causes of action available to the patient prior to the law’s enactment,
but it did add a new cause of action: breach of statutory duty. Id. at ch. 9.
Developments in the doctrine of informed consent in Israeli law thus can
contribute to the discussion of the doctrine’s evolution in Anglo-American
law.
9. Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL 52,
[2004]
1
A.C.
309
(U.K),
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/52.html.
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of the court rulings in the Chappel and the Chester cases,
followed by a critical analysis of these decisions. Here I
comment on whether the courts treated the patient’s right to
autonomy as a separate interest, as Shultz has suggested. In
the analysis, I attempt to identify the reasons for the positions
taken by the courts. The third part of the paper (Section IV)
deals with the question of what the courts should have done in
both cases. I claim that the courts should have recognized a
new head of damage—interference with the patient’s right to
autonomy. I support my conclusions by referring to
considerations of efficient deterrence, administrative costs and
legal coherence. In the fourth part of the paper (Section V), I
discuss the Ali Daaka decision, in which Israel’s Supreme
Court ruled that interference with a patient’s right to
autonomy is a designated damage. In the fifth part (Section VI)
I claim that although Israel’s Supreme Court took an
important step forward in this ruling, that step was imperfect.
My comments focus on the subjective approach taken by the
court and how it affected assessment of the compensation. The
critical analysis of the decision is supplemented with the
suggestion that adoption of an objective approach to
compensation would have been preferable. In the sixth part
(Section VII) of the paper, I examine whether the objective
approach was adopted in the Rees case. A discussion of two
versions of the objective approach—the objective-proprietary
approach and the objective-tariff approach—ends this part.
The paper’s seventh part (Section VIII) concludes with a
summary of my thesis.

II. SHULTZ’S THESIS: AUTONOMY AS A NEW PROTECTED
INTEREST
Shultz offered a critical analysis of contemporary law.10
She argued that although the law recognizes the importance of
the patient’s right to autonomy, this right is not recognized as
a separate interest, worthy of protection in and of itself.11 The
right to autonomy, to date, has been awarded protection only
as a byproduct of two other different and separate legal
interests: the right to physical security (an interest protected
by the tort of assault) and the right to physical well-being (an
10. Shultz, supra note 1, at 220–56.
11. Id. at 219–20.
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interest protected by the tort of negligence).12 Shultz contended
that this doctrinal structure has led to lacunae in the legal
protection given the right to autonomy, and to a good degree of
juridical incoherence.13
In substantiating her argument that there are gaps in the
legal protection of the right to autonomy, Shultz provided a
series of examples: the confines placed on the physician’s duty
to obtain patient consent and to fully inform her about
invasive medical treatments;14 the adoption of a professional
standard as the measure determining the scope of disclosure
rather than adoption of the “reasonable patient” test, which
more appropriately reflects the interest requiring protection;15
the adoption of an objective test to determine causation as
opposed to the autonomy protective test, that is, a subjective
test that reflects consideration of the patient’s right to make
autonomous decisions;16 and the difficulty of obtaining
compensation for some categories of injury irrespective of the
clear presence of injury.17 The solution to these holes and lack
of protection is found, Shultz continued, in the legal
recognition of the patient’s right to autonomy as a distinct and
separate legal interest.18
Shultz further argued that her approach would do more
than provide full and comprehensive protection of the patient’s
right to autonomy; it also would align with the legal stance
taken in other branches of law, such as the constitutional
protection of the right to privacy;19 the defense provided by
civil law to other intangible interests (i.e., one’s right to a
reputation and the right to freedom from emotional anguish)20
and the imposition of broad disclosure obligations on all
parties to a contract as well as on manufacturers (i.e., the duty
to disclose potential dangers in a product or property).21
The proposed approach, Shultz stated, also would respond
to the characteristics of the medical system—that is, the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 219.
See id. at 248–56.
Id. at 232–41.
Id. at 241–48.
Id. at 248–49.
Id. at 251–52.
Id. at 276–81.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 279–81.
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presence of conflicts of interest as well as values dividing
physicians from patients,22 and the lack of medical certainty, a
factor that introduces considerable opportunities for
discretionary choice with respect to medical treatment.23 This
situation justifies the transfer of decision-making authority to
the patient on the one hand, and recognition of the patient’s
right to choose as a separate legal interest on the other.24
When expanding upon her thesis, Schultz challenges the
allegations that recognition of this new legal interest will cause
harm to the patient’s health,25 raise medical costs,26
unreasonably expand the physician’s liability, or cause damage
to the physician’s status as a result of turning him into a
technical purveyor of information. Recognition of an
independent interest in patient autonomy, so she claims,
would not broaden physicians’ liability, especially since the
more that patients are informed and participate in decision
making, the less the likelihood that they will file a claim.27 As
to the fear of damaging the physician’s status, Shultz contends
that this fear is baseless since the doctor remains the
responsible advisor to the patient.28
Shultz is willing to recognize a new head of damage—
interference with the right to autonomy. From her perspective,
not only is the patient’s right to autonomy to be recognized as
an interest separate and independent from the interests of
physical well-being and physical security, any interference
with the exercise of this right is to be considered sufficient to
award the patient compensation even if that interference does
not result in physical injury.29
Before continuing, I would like to comment about my
22. Id. at 272–75.
23. Id. at 270–72. This argument requires some explanation. Shultz
argues that medical uncertainty destroys the possibility of a single correct
answer, leaving many answers in competition with one another. In this
situation, choosing among alternative courses implicates the patient’s
individual characterizes. Conflicts of interest, as well as values separating
physicians from patients, undermine the doctor’s claim to authority and
intensify the patient’s right to autonomy. Id.
24. See id. at 276.
25. Id. at 292–95.
26. Id. at 295–96
27. Id. at 296–97.
28. Id. at 297–98.
29. Id. at 290–91.
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choice of Shultz’s article and the decision to review her ideas at
this point of time.
Shultz is not the only scholar who has adopted this
approach. Others also have argued that separate protection
should be given to the patient’s right to autonomy so that any
interference with this right will entitle the plaintiff to
compensation.30
Yet Shultz’s thesis is no doubt the most comprehensive of
them all. As a result, her article is often mentioned as a
prominent paper in the legal literature dealing with the issue of
dignitary torts. For these reasons, I have chosen Shultz’s
thesis as the opening for my discussion
Indeed twenty-five years have passed since the publication
of Shultz’s article. During those years, the doctrine of informed
consent has been revised.31 Yet, I believe that Shultz’s critique
continues to be applicable inasmuch as no changes have been
made in American law regarding the interest protected. A
review of the non-U.S. cases, handed down in the last decade,
returned my attention to Shultz’s thesis and its continued if
not greater relevance. I believe that these cases require a new
observation of Shultz’s thesis and of American law. My article
offers such observation.

30. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 69–
70, 79 (1984); JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 122–23 (9th ed. 1998);
Alan Meisel, A ‘Dignitary Tort’ as a Bridge Between The Idea of Informed
Consent and The Law of Informed Consent, in MEDICINE AND THE LAW 157–
58, 163–64 (Bernand M. Dickens ed., 1993); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed
Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975); Jay Katz,
Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137,
160–62 & n. 76 (1977); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed
Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261,
365–67 (1999); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136,
188–90 (1992); Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor
Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 330 (2002); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B.
Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of
Justiciable Causation, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609, 616, 649, 651–52,
665.
31. Most of these revisions concern the duty of disclosure. For a
description of this changes see e.g., MICHAEL A. JONES, MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE 652–74 (4th ed. 2008).
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III. THE CHAPPEL AND CHESTER DECISIONS
A. THE CHAPPEL DECISION
The facts of Chappel, ultimately decided by the Supreme
Court of Australia, are quite simple. The plaintiff, Mrs. Hart,
underwent surgery at the hands of the defendant, Dr. Chappel,
for the purpose of resolving a medical condition in her throat.32
The defendant had not warned the plaintiff of the mild risk of
damage to her vocal cords that was inherent in the procedure,
even though the plaintiff had articulated an interest in the
risks posed by the procedure, especially with reference to her
voice.33 Though the surgery was performed with reasonable
skill, this risk was realized and the plaintiff, left with a
damaged voice, was forced to leave her place of employment.34
At the time that the surgery was performed, it was treated
by the doctor as an elective procedure.35 The plaintiff’s medical
condition, however, was “relentlessly progressive.”36 Hence,
had she not undergone the procedure then, she eventually
would have had to undergo the procedure anyway, which was
considered to be the sole remedy available for her complaint.37
Accordingly, the court decided that even had the plaintiff been
informed of the mild risk of injury to her voice as a result of
the procedure, the surgery would eventually have been
performed.38 Moreover, the risk to her voice was associated
with procedures of this type, irrespective of when they were
performed and the identity of the surgeon.39
The plaintiff argued that had the defendant informed her
of the risk inherent in the procedure, she would not have
acquiesced to his performance of the surgery at that time.40
The court accepted as credible the plaintiff’s argument that she
would have sought another opinion and would have selected a

32. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 233, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 253.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 237.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 239–240, 258.
39. Id. at 239–41.
40. Id. at 233.
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more experienced surgeon to perform the surgery.41 The
plaintiff further argued that considering the fact that the
defendant had reneged on his duty to disclose the respective
risk, however mild it was thought to be, he should be required
to pay damages for injuring her voice based on the tort of
negligence and breach of contract.42 Although the charge of
negligence, based upon the breach of duty of disclosure,
aroused no debate,43 the issue of causation raised serious
difficulties.
The source of the difficulty rested on the fact that the
plaintiff’s medical condition was expected to deteriorate and
that her condition could be treated solely by this procedure.44
Therefore, as the plaintiff herself admitted, even if the risk
inherent in the surgery had been disclosed, she would have
agreed to undergo the surgery at some point.45 Moreover, the
risk of injury was inherent in the procedure; the plaintiff would
therefore have been exposed to that risk whenever the surgery
was performed.46
Three of the sitting judges ruled in favor of the plaintiff;
they stated that she had proved causation.47 Justice Gaudron
grounded her individual opinion in four fundamental
arguments. First, the defendant was required to fulfill his duty
of disclosure to the plaintiff and inform her, in detail, of the
foreseeable risk inherent in the procedure.48 The defendant
had ignored his duty, and the said risk did indeed materialize;
hence, his breach of this duty could be considered to have
41. Id.
42. Id. at 235.
43. The court’s ruling in the first instance determined that the
defendant had breached the duty of disclosure with respect to the plaintiff
and thus had been negligent. Id. at 254. The parties did not appeal the
court’s decision in this matter. Id. at 254–55. For a discussion of the
court’s ruling with respect to the duty of disclosure imposed on
physicians, see Ian Freckelton, The New Duty to Warn, [1999] ALT. L.J. 4,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AltLJ/1999/4.html;
Owen Bradfield, At the Heart of Chappel v Hart: A Warning About
Warning!,
http://www.alsa.asn.au/files/acj/2000/chappel_hart.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
44. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237.
45. Id. at 258.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 239, 260, 278. For an analysis of the judges’ decisions in
this case see, e.g., Peter Cane, A Warning About Causation, 115 L.Q. REV.
21 (1999).
48. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 238–39.
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either caused or contributed to the damage unless some legal
rule or legal consideration could justify a different
conclusion.49 Second, no sufficient reason could be identified
that might justify an alternative decision. The damage the
plaintiff suffered was not only exposure to risk; it also entailed
the physical injury suffered de facto.50 Moreover, even if the
plaintiff did take it upon herself to face the risk inherent in the
procedure at some future date, she was nonetheless
unprepared to do so at the time the defendant had performed
the surgery.51 Third, had the defendant informed the plaintiff
of the risk, she might not have submitted to the surgery at that
time.52 Therefore, considering the low probability of the risk,
she may very well not have suffered the physical injury at all,
and the defendant’s breach of the duty of disclosure could be
considered a contributing factor to the injury suffered.53
Fourth, although the risk was independent of the time of the
procedure’s performance and the identity of the surgeon, the
probability of realizing that risk would have declined had the
surgery been performed by a more experienced and skilled
surgeon.54
Contrary to his colleague, Justice Gummow did not base
his opinion on the assumption that the procedure’s
performance by another, more skilled and experienced surgeon
would have reduced the risk inherent in the procedure.55 This
divergence, however, did not prevent him from concurring with
Justice Gaudron that the plaintiff had, indeed, established
causation.56 At the core of his opinion is an approach stating
that the issue of causation requires reference to the scope and
purpose of the relevant legal rule.57 In cases like Chappel
responses to the question of causation therefore relates to the
substance and purpose of the duty of disclosure, a duty
derived from the patient’s right to make a decision about
whether to accept a proposed treatment. The purpose of this
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 239–40.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id. at 241.
See id. at 260–62 (Gummow, J., concurring).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 255–57.
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duty is to enable the patient to make informed decisions on the
basis of relevant information.58 Justice Gummow further
stressed that the materialized risk, which was at the root of the
plaintiff’s injury, is the same risk that should have been
revealed to her by force of the duty of disclosure as well as the
rationale behind that duty’s existence.59 An additional
consideration was the fact that the risk of injury to her voice
was especially meaningful to the plaintiff, as demonstrated by
her research into the subject.60 Given these circumstances,
the judge was persuaded that it would be unjust to discharge
the defendant of his responsibility to pay damages on the basis
of some hypothetical scenario regarding how events would
have unfolded had the plaintiff undergone the procedure at
another time and at the hands of another surgeon.61 Given the
facts indicating that if the surgery had been performed at
another time and by a more expert surgeon the risk to the
plaintiff would have declined considerably (a fact indicating
that the “but for” test applied), Justice Gummow concluded
that the plaintiff had proven causation.62
Positioning himself between the approaches taken by the
two other members of the majority, Justice Kirby, also ruled in
favor of the plaintiff.63 He argued that the common-sense
approach to causation supported a decision in favor of
awarding compensation to the plaintiff, as did the substance
and purpose of the duties violated in this case: the duty of
disclosure and the duty to respond to all questions honestly.64
Even though these duties impose heavy burdens on
physicians, they are integral to the law; it is therefore fitting
that infringements of those duties will invite legal
consequences.65 Justice Kirby was convinced that this was
especially true in the current case. The plaintiff had clearly
expressed her fears, and had the defendant responded to those
fears, it is decidedly possible that the plaintiff would not have
undergone the procedure at the given date and would not have
suffered the respective injuries—especially considering the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

256–57.
257–58.
257.
262.
256–57, 260–262.
276–79 (Kirby, J., concurring).
276.
277.
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rarity of the risk and her contention that she would have
turned to a more skilled and experienced physician.66 In
consideration of all the circumstances, Justice Kirby was
convinced that the damage in this case was caused, not by
unrelated intervening problems, but solely by the physician’s
failure to inform the patient.67 Hence, as the defendant had
not complied with the burden of persuasion68 regarding
causation, Justice Kirby ruled in favor of the plaintiff.69

B. THE CHESTER DECISION
The factual basis of Chester, a case decided by the British
House of Lords, closely resembles that of Chappel. In this case
the plaintiff had been suffering severe back pain.70 The
defendant, a neurosurgeon to whom the plaintiff had turned
for counseling, recommended that the defendant undergo
surgery.71 Three days later, the surgery was performed with
the plaintiff’s agreement.72 Although the procedure was
performed with reasonable skill, the plaintiff suffered
considerable damage to her nervous system in the course of
the surgery and was left partially paralyzed.73 The risk of such
injury was anticipated in one percent to two percent of the
cases.74 Claiming the tort of negligence, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant had failed to warn her of the risk.75 The
plaintiff also stated that had she been given the risk
information, she would have first sought another opinion
before agreeing to performance of the procedure at that time.76
Nevertheless, the court did not rule (and was not requested to
rule) on whether the plaintiff would have undergone the
66. Id. at 277–78.
67. Id. at 278.
68. In Australian law as in American law, the onus to prove causation
is on the plaintiff. Id. at 270. Yet, Justice Kirby ruled that once the
plaintiff demonstrates that a breach of duty had accrued, closely followed
by damage, a prima facie casual connection is established. In this case,
the burden of proof would be shifted to the defendant. Id. at 273.
69. Id. at 278–79.
70. Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 140 (U.K.).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 138.
76. Id. at 141.
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surgery at all, or whether there was any way to reduce the risk
of injury.77 However, the court did rule that the risk remained
constant, independent of when the procedure was performed
and independent of the identity of the surgeon.78 In other
words, the court found that the plaintiff was exposed to the
identical risk—in terms of the probability of its materialization
and its nature—even if the surgery had been performed on a
different day or by a more experienced surgeon.
Similar to the Chappel case, the question of negligence
raised no obstacles in Chester,79 and the debate centered on
the question of causation. Because the plaintiff was unable to
establish that she would have completely avoided undergoing
the surgery, and because her entire argument revolved around
her deferral of the procedure, though deferral that would not
have altered the risk inherent in the procedure, the question of
causation arose.80
The three judges submitting the majority opinion—Lord
Steyn, Lord Hope, and Lord Walker—were persuaded that the
plaintiff had proven causation.81 Although some minor
differences can be found in their separate opinions, the
following arguments were common to all three.
First, establishment of causation is an issue pertaining
to legal policy.82 Hence, when establishing causation and thus
assigning legal liability, identification of the correlated rights
and duties of both parties, as well as of the relevant legal
interests, is required.83 The protected interest in Chester was
the right of every adult to make a medical decision having the

77. Id. at 140–41.
78. Id. at 141.
79. The court in the first instance ruled that the defendant had
breached the duty of disclosure owed to the plaintiff and was thus
negligent. This decision was not appealed. Id. at 148. For a discussion of
the court’s ruling with respect to the duty of disclosure as imposed on
physicians, see David Meyers, Chester v. Afshar: Sayonara, Sub
Silentio,Sidaway?, in FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE 255
(Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2006).
80. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 141.
81. See id. at 134.
82. See, e.g., id. at 139, 146, 158, 162–63.
83. See., e.g., id. at 162–63 (Hope, J., concurring) (“The function of the
law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when
duties have been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one,
stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content.”).

KARAKO-EYAL N. Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy
Right? MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726.

684

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:2

potential to influence her life, which is a basic right.84 The
physician’s duty was to avoid providing any treatment without
first receiving the patient’s informed consent. The physician’s
duty fulfilled two purposes: the first, prevention of realization
of risks that the patient is not prepared to take upon herself;
the second, showing the appropriate respect and concern for
the patient’s right to autonomy and dignity.85
Second, the risk materialized was the same risk about
which the defendant was to warn the plaintiff.86 Had the
defendant not failed to warn the plaintiff of the possible danger
of injury, she would have delayed the procedure, the injury
would not have taken place when it did, and the probability
that the injury would have been suffered on another occasion
would have been lowered.87
Third, considerations of policy and corrective justice
supported vindication of the patient’s right to autonomy and to
dignity, and thus a slight departure from the traditional rules
of causation.88 This slight departure was expressed in the
court’s decision that causation had been proven despite the
fact that, in light of the circumstances of the case—the plaintiff
could not avoid the surgery and the risk was inherent in the
procedure—there were doubts as to whether the “but-for” test
had been established. In the current case, the court continued,
the defendant owed duty of disclosure to the patient and the
duty was breached, and the resulting harm fell within the
sphere of the duty.89 Assignment of theoretical meaning and
practical relevance to the duty imposed on physicians and to
the patient’s right to autonomy thus demanded that the
defendant compensate the plaintiff for the injuries suffered.90

C. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHAPPEL AND CHESTER
84. See, e.g., id. at 162.
85. Id. at 138–39, 142, 144, 148–49, 164. This aspect of the decision,
that is, the idea that the foundations of the duty of disclosure rest on the
patient’s right to autonomy, is also mentioned in later decisions. See, e.g.,
Khalid v. Barnet & Chase Farm Hosp. NHS Trust, [2007] EWHC 664 (QB)
(U.K.),
¶¶
63–67,
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2007/644.html.
86. See Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 164 (Walker, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 165.
88. Id. at 162–63.
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id.
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DECISIONS
A superficial reading of the decisions gives the impression
that the courts adopted Shultz’s thesis in both cases. By
placing the patient’s right to autonomy at the center of their
deliberations, the courts diverged from traditional rules of
causation, and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Each decision
recognized the importance of the right to autonomy as well as
autonomy as an interest to be considered when ruling on
whether there was causation. This position motivated the
courts to devise a creative solution enabling them to award
compensation to plaintiffs who had suffered interference with
their right to autonomy thus eliminating or alleviating the
difficulty of proving causation. Especially important are the
courts’ rulings stating that the correct approach to be taken in
cases of this type involves correcting the injustice done in the
form of interference with the plaintiffs’ right to autonomy. The
judges were thus persuaded that any other approach would
not contribute to credible judicial policy nor serve the interests
of corrective justice.91
Yet a careful review of the decisions soon reveals the
cracks in this initial impression. What first appears to be the
courts’ adoption of the Shultz thesis quickly evaporates.
Although both decisions appear to give considerable weight to
the right to autonomy in judicial rulings, and even though the
courts’ objective was to protect this right, the interest
protected was, in fact, the patient’s right to physical well-being
rather than to autonomy. Moreover, the degree to which these
decisions granted any protection to the patient’s right to
autonomy per se was only partial. In the following, I explain

91. In her article, Shultz herself dealt with how the issue of causation
would be affected by the thesis she had suggested. Shultz, supra note 1,
at 286–91. She was confident that adoption of her position would lead to
amelioration of strict rules of causation through rejection of the balance of
probabilities test and adoption of the probability (proportional) test. Id.
According to the latter test, the court is to assess the probability that a
patient would have chosen an alternative therapy had there not been any
interference with her right to autonomy. Id. at 287. The patient would
then be entitled to compensation on the basis of this assessment. Id. The
advantage of the probability test lies in its power to prevent rejection of
claims based on the argument that the plaintiff had not complied with the
burden of proof—according to the balance of probabilities test—that her
decision would have been different had her right to autonomy not suffered
interference. Id. Such a phenomenon is common in claims based on the
doctrine of informed consent. See id. at 286–87.
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why.
First, the courts in both Chester and Chappel ruled that
compensation was to be awarded to the plaintiffs for the
physical injuries they had suffered as a result of the treatment
received despite the absence of causality between the breach of
the duty of disclosure and the injury sustained or, at the very
least, the presence of serious doubt regarding the existence of
such causality.92 Although both courts portrayed their rulings
as easing the traditional rules of causation, the fact is that
they did not modify these rules but, in effect, sought causation
where it was nonexistent.93
We can conclude from the considerations voiced, as
reported above, that resting at the heart of the majorities’
decisions in both cases was the assumption that had violation
of the duty of disclosure not occurred, the plaintiffs would not
have suffered any physical injury because they would have
delayed the procedure and because of the rarity of the
subsequent attendant risk.94 This line of reasoning enabled the
judges to “temper” the traditional rules of causation and to
base their ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on legal policy
considerations.
This assumption, however, was inherently false. The
probability that some medical risk, however small, will
materialize remains constant irrespective of the timing of a
92. See Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 242–44, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html; Chester,
[2005] 1 A.C. at 162–63.
93. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 255–57; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 162–
63. Criticism of these decisions in this vein was expressed by numerous
legal scholars. See, e.g., Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Medical NonDisclosure, Causation and Autonomy, 118 L.Q. REV. 540, 542 (2002);
Bradfield, supra note 43; see supra text accompanying notes 57–66;
Jeremy Clarke, Causation in Chappel v. Hart: Common Sense or
Coincidence?, 6 J.L. & MED. 335, 346–47 (1999); Charles Foster, It Should
Be, Therefore It Is, 154 NEW L.J. 1644, 1644–45 (2004); Tony Honoré,
Medical Non-Disclosure, Causation and Risk: Chappel v. Hart, 7 TORTS L.J.
1, 7–8 (1999); Marc Stauch, Taking the Consequences for Failure to Warn
of Medical Risks, 63 MOD. L. REV. 261, 266–67 (2000); Stephen M.
Waddams, Causation, Physicians and Disclosure of Risks, 7 TORT L. REV.
5, 6 (1999).
94. As we have seen, this assumption also stood at the heart of
Justice Gaudron’s decision in Chappel, as well as Justice Kirby’s, which
was likewise based on the argument that the performance of the
procedure by a more competent surgeon might have reduced the inherent
risk. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 242, 277.
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procedure. The example of a game of roulette, as Justice
Hoffman noted in Chester, provides a good demonstration of
this flaw: if the probability that the number seven would come
up in a roulette game is one to thirty-seven, this probability
remains the same even if the gambler leaves the casino
without placing a bet and returns later to bet once more.95
Hence, the assumption that transmission of information to
the plaintiffs would have led them to defer their respective
surgeries and thereby prevent the physical injury they suffered
is fallacious. It was therefore erroneous to conclude that
breach of the duty of disclosure was a “but for” cause of the
plaintiffs’ injuries. Such injuries were likely to have been
suffered, with the same probability, whenever the procedure
was performed.96
The sole assumption warranting the conclusion that nondisclosure had caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs
was that had the surgery been performed by a different, more
experienced and skilled surgeon, the risk inherent in the
procedure would have been reduced.97 Yet this argument was
not raised by the plaintiff in the Chester case and so became
irrelevant to the court’s decision. Although the argument was
raised in Chappel, only one of the sitting judges—Justice
Gaudron—based her ruling on these grounds.98 Justice Kirby
mentioned such a possibility but was insufficiently clear about
its factual aspects.99 Furthermore, however much Justice
Kirby might have found this argument acceptable, it
represented only one in a range of his considerations and was
certainly not the main reason for his decision.100 The third
member of the majority, Justice Gummow, totally ignored this
argument.101
95. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 147 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
96. For more on this argument, see IAN FRECKELTON & DANUTA
MENDELSON, CAUSATION IN LAW AND MEDICINE 394 (2002).
97. For more on this argument, see id. at 394.
98. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 241–42.
99. Id. at 277–78 (Kirby, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 276.
101. Id. at 255–63. For a similar description of the judges’ approaches
concerning this factual issue, see Stauch, supra note 93, at 265–67. For a
more extreme approach stating that all the judges in the majority would
have ruled in favor of the existence of causation, even if the probability of
the risk materializing had been identical under the hands of a more
skilled and experienced surgeon, see FRECKELTON & MENDELSON, supra
note 96, at 395–96. By contrast, in a later decision reached by Justice
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Given the assumption that even if the surgery had been
performed at another time and by a different surgeon the
attendant risk would have remained similar, we have no choice
but to conclude that the plaintiffs were unable to prove that
but for infringement of the duty of disclosure, they would not
have suffered any damage. In other words, we find it difficult to
avoid the conclusion that causation was not substantiated or,
at the very least, that its existence was in serious doubt.102
Yet the Chappel and Chester courts both chose to
compensate the plaintiffs for the physical injury suffered. Like
their predecessors, they applied the doctrine of informed
consent as alternative grounds for awarding compensation for
physical injuries;103 only now the awards were made in cases
arousing serious doubt regarding causation.
Interestingly, both the Chappel and Chester courts chose
to base their decisions on the significance of the right to
Gummow, he described the rulings of the two other judges in the Chappel
majority—Justices Gaudron and Kirby—as having been based on the
assumption that the risk would have declined had the surgeon been more
skilled and experienced. See Rosenberg v. Percival (2001) 205 C.L.R. 434,
464
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2001/18.html.
John
Gunson developed an interesting opinion in this regard, specifically, that
although the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the probability of risk
would have declined had a more skillful and experienced surgeon
performed the procedure, her argument would still have been insufficient
to prove causation. This was so in absence of evidence that the harm
suffered had resulted from the increased risk to which she was exposed as
opposed to the risk inherent in the procedure. See John Gunson,
Turbulent Causal Waters: The High Court, Causation and Medical
Negligence, 9 TORT L. REV. 53, 77 (2001).
102. Most judges in the minority opinions of these cases came to the
same conclusion. See, e.g., Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 286–87; Chester,
[2005] 1 A.C. at 147.
103. The main and immediate purpose of the doctrine of informed
consent had been the extension of physicians’ liability in addition to the
guarantee of compensation to a far greater number of patients who had
suffered injury in the wake of medical treatment. This phenomenon
represented part of a more general trend toward ensuring appropriate
compensation to a larger number of injured parties and the broadening of
liability to entities known to take advantage of the distribution of damage.
For more on this argument and a description of the development of
informed consent, see Alan Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical
Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent,
56 NEB. L. REV. 51 (1977); IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW
161–63 (1993); Gerald Robertson, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment,
97 L.Q. REV. 102, 109–12 (1981).
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autonomy and on their aspirations to endow that right with
the appropriate protection as well as with practical force. Yet
this firm, rational basis for the decisions totally contradicts the
cases’ final outcomes. Instead of identifying the actual injury
suffered by the plaintiffs—interference with the right to
autonomy— and awarding the plaintiffs compensation for this
damage, the courts chose to award compensation for their
physical injuries even though neither plaintiff was able to
prove, as required, causation between the non-disclosure and
the harm suffered.104
Another interesting observation is that the Chappel court
was also offered a theory—the theory of loss of chance—that
might have led to awarding compensation for the injury to the
plaintiff’s right to autonomy. This theory was suggested by the
defendant, who argued that the injury suffered by the plaintiff
was not physical but, rather, the lost chance of having the
surgery performed by another physician and at a different
time.105 Although the defendant’s objective in proposing this
argument was to deny the plaintiff any compensation, based
on the contention that the lost chance had no value, the court
could have accepted the notion and awarded compensation
based on interference with the plaintiff’s autonomy,106 as I now
104. It is worth mentioning in this regard the approach taken by
Justice Hoffman in Chester. Justice Hoffman was persuaded that the
plaintiff had not proven causation. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 147.
Nevertheless, given the fact that the plaintiff’s right to autonomy had
suffered interference, he considered ruling in favor of a modest solatium.
Id. He himself expressed no enthusiasm regarding this possibility,
whether due to the difficulty of determining the appropriate amount of
compensation, or whether due to the fact that the high costs of the
proceedings made tort law an inappropriate vehicle for allocating damages
in such cases. Id. The idea of awarding the plaintiff a sum of money in the
form of a solatium in cases where the right of autonomy had been
abrogated but where there was no possibility of proving causation was
raised in a later ruling. The idea was briefly discussed by the court but
rejected for procedural reasons. Review of statements made by the court
indicates that the idea was considered radical, which induced the court to
act with circumspection. See, e.g., SEM v. Mid Yorkshire Hosps., [2005]
EWHC
(QB),
B3,
[59]–[60],
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2005/B3.html.
105. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237–38.
106. The defendant claimed that because the injury suffered by the
plaintiff was the lost chance of undergoing the surgery at a different time
and with another surgeon, and because the risk inherent in the procedure
had remained constant irrespective of when it was performed or the
surgeon’s identity, the lost chance lacked any value. Id. This argument
raises the question of how to assess compensation for a lost chance, an
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make clear.
The right to autonomy refers to the right to make decisions
that reflect the values and preferences of the decisionmaker.107 In order to realize this right, the decision-maker has
to receive all the information she considers relevant.
Transmission of partial information undermines the prospect
that the decision-maker’s choice will reflect her values and
preferences, and thus her right to autonomy.
Returning to Chappel, it follows that a close connection
can be established between the award of compensation to the
plaintiff for her lost chance that the surgery would be
performed at another time and by a different surgeon, choices
that more accurately reflect her preferences, and the award of
compensation for the interference with her right to autonomy.
Hence, the court was given, in effect, an opportunity to develop
a liability theory centered on the right to autonomy as opposed
to the interest in physical well-being. It appears, however, that
the court rejected the theory of lost chance108 without
pursuing development of the alternative idea, as I have
suggested.
The approach adopted by the courts, that is, their focus on
the physical injury suffered by the two plaintiffs, together with
their avoidance of the fact that the real damage suffered was
interference with their right to autonomy, was elaborated not
only in their final decisions but in the substantiating
arguments as well. As we shall soon see, this reasoning had
undesirable outcomes—the extension of only partial protection
issue discussed later with reference to assessment of compensation for
interference with the right to autonomy. We can venture here that the
conclusion reached by the defendant was not inescapable, and that a
different theory regarding the assessment of compensation would have
allowed award of compensation under these conditions as well.
107. See Shultz, supra note 1, at 220.
108. Rejection of the theory of lost chance rested on several
considerations: That the injury actually suffered was a physical injury,
that no duty was imposed upon the physician to provide the plaintiff with
an opportunity for the procedure to be performed by a more skilled
surgeon, and that he was not required to refer her to a more skilled
surgeon. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237–38, 88. Furthermore, recognition
of the lost chance as an injury demanding compensation is constrained by
the difficulty of making a reasonable assessment of the damage. See id. at
274–75, 78. Finally, from a procedural prospective, the plaintiff demanded
compensation for her physical injury and not for the lost chance. Id. at
278–79.
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to the right to autonomy.
Considerable stress was placed in both Chappel and
Chester on the fact that the risk against which the defendants
were to warn the plaintiffs had materialized in the form of
physical injury.109 In effect, it was the chain of events
beginning with the breach of disclosure and concluding in
realization of physical injury that made it inconceivable,
according to the judges in the majority, to free the defendants
of liability and to deny the plaintiffs any compensation.110 As
stated, the judges in the majority held that such outcomes
contradict corrective justice, and threaten to empty the duty of
disclosure of its meaning.
Yet these considerations, however intuitive and rational
they may appear to be, are problematic. In both cases it was
agreed by the courts that the inherent risk to the plaintiffs was
mild. In fact, in Chappel, the said risk was described as
rare.111 Moreover, the courts in both cases stressed that had
the two plaintiffs undergone the surgery at a later date, it was
quite likely that they would not have been harmed.112 The
injury’s realization was therefore a matter of bad luck, with a
low probability of transpiring. Yet, the breach of the duty of
disclosure, like the injury to the plaintiffs’ right to autonomy,
would have remained effectively the same whether or not the
risks had materialized. Nevertheless, the courts’ line of
argument implied that had the risk not materialized, the
plaintiffs would not have been entitled to any compensation for
the infringement to their right to autonomy. If this analysis is
correct, protection of the right to autonomy rested, in both
cases, on the realization of risk and its associated physical
injury.113 Hence, the legal protection given to the right of
autonomy was limited to cases marked by these two
characteristics: realization of the said risk and the existence of
physical injury.

109. See, e.g., Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 163; Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at
238.
110. These facts were stressed by all the judges in the majority in both
cases as central to their decision to digress from traditional rules of
causation. See Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 239–40, 260, 276–77; Chester,
[2005] 1 A.C. at 146, 163, 165–66.
111. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 242, 267.
112. Id.; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 142.
113. Substantiation of this argument can be found, for example, in
Justice Kirby’s reasoning in Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 271–72.
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There is little doubt that linking the plaintiffs’ right to
compensation to the realization of risk and the suffering of
physical injury appeared natural in the circumstances of
Chappel and Chester. Both plaintiffs had been harmed, and
both claimed compensation on the basis of those injuries. A
different but related question concerns whether the linking of
the right to compensation to the realization of risk and the
experience of physical injury, the result of which was only
partial protection of the right to autonomy, is necessary and
justified. As I will later argue, the response to this question
should be in the negative.
The approach taken by the courts in the two decisions—
that is, disregard of the fact that the real damage sustained by
the plaintiffs was interference with their right to autonomy—
was expressed in connection with another issue. In both
decisions, the judges accepted the contention that had the
plaintiffs been fully informed about the procedure’s risk, they
would have delayed the surgery.114 This position lies at the
core of the conclusion that had the defendants fully informed
them of the risks, the plaintiffs would presumably not have
suffered any injury.115 At the same time, the judges agreed
that if the evidence had indicated that the plaintiffs would not
have postponed the time of the surgery but allowed it to be
performed as agreed, it would be impossible to award them
compensation.116 Although this conclusion may be justified
with respect to the plaintiffs’ physical injuries, it cannot be
accepted so far as it relates to the injury to their right to
autonomy.
I argue here that in the wake of the breach of the duty of
disclosure, the plaintiffs’ right to autonomy was abridged,
irrespective of whether they would have postponed the surgery
or not. However, because the courts focused on the physical
injury sustained by the plaintiffs rather than on the
114. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 254; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 141.
115. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 141.
116. Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237, 260, 273; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at
141–42, 144, 154. Literature concurs with this position. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 105–06 (2006). This rule was
also applied in a later decision in which the plaintiffs based their position
on Chester. See SEM v. Mid Yorkshire Hosps., [2005] EWHC (QB), B3,
[36],
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2005/B3.html.
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interference with their right to autonomy, the right to
compensation became subject to a decision different from the
one made by the patient, a condition that circumscribed the
protection given to the right of autonomy.
Another interesting question relates to why the courts
chose to focus on the physical injury suffered, a choice that
bound protection of the right to autonomy with evidence of
physical injury as well as to the decision of causation. In other
words: why were the courts unprepared to adopt the notion
that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs for which they were
due compensation was interference with their right to
autonomy?
The simplest response rests on the circumstances of the
cases presented before the court, which I reiterate. As a result
of medical treatment meant to improve their condition, the two
plaintiffs suffered considerable physical injury.117 Yet, when it
was ruled that their medical treatment had not been delivered
negligently, it became impossible to award them compensation
on theory of negligent treatment.118 At the same time, the
plaintiffs were denied information on the risk inherent in the
proposed surgery, a risk that came to fruition in these cases
causing severe and permanent damage.119 Moreover, the
plaintiff in Chappel had thoroughly investigated the risk to her
voice were she to undergo the procedure and had expressed
fears regarding the very injury she eventually suffered;120 the
plaintiff in Chester had expressed a preference for avoiding the
surgery altogether if the procedure was not essential.121 The
courts certainly found it difficult to deny the plaintiffs’ claims;
had they done so, it would have left the plaintiffs bereft of
compensation for the injuries suffered. The desire to
compensate the plaintiffs for their physical injuries, together
with the defendants’ breach of duty of disclosure, led the
courts to link together two separate objectives: compensation
for the plaintiffs’ physical injury and protection of their right to
autonomy.
Yet analysis of the courts’ approach indicates a deeper
explanation for their decision, one rooted in the doctrine of
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 253; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 150.
Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 266. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 142.
Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 237; Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 142.
Chappel, 195 C.L.R. at 257.
Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 140.
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informed consent and the characteristics of the cause of action
presented by the plaintiffs, i.e., the tort of negligence.
As already noted, the primary and immediate objective for
elaboration of the doctrine of informed consent was expansion
of physicians’ liability and guaranteeing that compensation
would be awarded to a much greater number of patients
harmed as a result of medical treatment, especially those who
were unable to associate the cause of their injuries with
negligent medical treatment.122 Indeed, from the outset, the
doctrine of informed consent was presented as resting on the
right to autonomy.123 The courts, however, continued to focus
on compensation to the patients for their physical injuries. It
should come as no surprise, then, that the courts continued in
this vein in the Chappel and Chester cases.
The award of compensation for the physical injuries
suffered by the plaintiffs—as opposed to interference with the
right to autonomy—is likewise closely related to the
characteristics of the cause of action presented by the
plaintiffs, the tort of negligence. The existence of some “injury”
represents one cornerstone of the tort of negligence and an
initial condition for assigning liability.124 Indeed, with time,
this tort’s objectives were broadened beyond protection of the
interest in physical well-being to the recognition of the injured
party’s right to compensation for other injuries, such as pure
economic injury and pure mental anguish;125 yet all of these
injuries are considered tangible injuries. Furthermore, with
respect to medical accidents, the tort of negligence has
historically focused on the award of compensation to the
patient for the physical, that is, tangible injury suffered.126 It
could therefore be expected that a similar approach, stressing
the physical injuries the plaintiffs suffered but disregarding the
real harm done to their right to autonomy, should be adopted

122. See Meisel, supra note 103, at 52, 56–60, 63–77; ENGLARD, supra
note 103; Robertson, supra note 103.
123. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of
Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1, 9–10 (Cal. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan.
1960).
124. See SIMON DEAKIN ET AL., MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN’S TORT LAW 113
(6th ed. 2008).
125. Id. at 139–142, 157–99.
126. ENGLARD, supra note 103, at 163–64.
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in the Chappel and Chester decisions.
Several scholars, especially Shultz, have repeatedly argued
that a major weakness of the tort of negligence in relation to
the doctrine of informed consent is the presentation of proof of
physical or some other tangible injury as a precondition for
awarding compensation.127 Due to this focus, the true damage
suffered by the patient, i.e., interference with her right to
autonomy, has been ignored.128

IV. WHAT SHOULD THE COURTS HAVE DONE IN
CHAPPEL AND CHESTER? — A NEWLY IDENTIFIED HEAD
OF DAMAGE
As can be deduced from the previous critical analysis of
the Chappel and the Chester rulings, I do not concur with the
approach applied by the courts in either case. What, then,
would I have recommended they do? I suggest that in the first
stage, the court should have avoided awarding compensation
for the physical injuries suffered. In the absence of causation,
there was no reason to award compensation for such
injuries.129 As to the second stage, I believe that the courts
should have recognized the existence of a new head of

127. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 1, at 232–41; see also ENGLARD, supra
note 103, at 164; EMILY JACKSON, MEDICAL LAW—TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 300, 302, 304 (2006); KATZ, supra note 30; Roger Crisp,
Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent, and Autonomy, 17 J.L. &
SOC’Y 77, 80–81 (1990); Meisel, supra note 103, at 132–33; Peter H.
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 925, 936 (1994);
Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 616, 620.
128. See Shultz, supra note 1, at 251–53.
129. This argument should be distinguished so far as it relates to
Chappel. In that case, if the plaintiff had been able to establish that had
the defendant transmitted the information about the attendant risk of the
surgery she would have been able to turn to a more skilled and
experienced surgeon; that performance of the surgery by such a surgeon
would have significantly reduced the related risk; and that realization of
that risk resulted from the heightened risk to which she was exposed, the
court could have ruled that the requirements of causation had been met,
making it possible to award her compensation for the physical injury.
However, as we have seen, only one of the three judges in the majority
based his decision on this fact-based premise. For an argument in this
spirit, see Kenyon Mason & Douglas Brodie, Bolam, Bolam—Wherefore Art
Thou Bolam?, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 298, 305 (2005). For a different
approach, according to which the court was to compensate the plaintiff for
the physical injury suffered despite the absence of causation, see Honoré,
supra note 93.
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damage—interference with the right to autonomy.130
According to this new approach, when a patient’s right to
autonomy suffers interference by a breach of the duty of
disclosure or some other method (i.e., her ability to make
decisions of her own free will is undermined), that patient
suffers an injury for which she is entitled to compensation.
This injury is experienced concurrent with the breach of the
duty of disclosure, and its remedy is unrelated to the
realization of the risk inherent in the respective procedure and
the existence of physical injury. Moreover, remedy for this
injury is not subject to proof of a different decision that might
have been made by the patient. Proof of a breach of the duty of
disclosure necessarily entails proof of causation between the
breach of that duty and the damage claimed by the patient,
that is, interference with her right to autonomy. Of course, if
the patient is able to prove that interference with her right to
autonomy caused physical injury, she will be eligible for
remedy for this injury as well. In any case, no remedy is to be
awarded in the absence of proof of causation between the
interference with her right to autonomy and the physical
injury.
A number of arguments support the correctness of
recognizing this new tort, namely, the interference with the
right to autonomy. Because Shultz has provided some of the
relevant considerations in her article, I present those
arguments yet to be elaborated.

A. ADOPTION OF THIS NEW HEAD OF DAMAGE IS COMMENSURATE
WITH THE PATIENT’S RIGHT TO AUTONOMY
Acknowledgement of this right and, it follows, bona fide
expression of its salience, requires its recognition as an
independent and distinctive value warranting remedy. Such

130. Support for this approach can be found in the literature. See
Mason & Brodie, supra note 129, at 305–06; Waddams, supra note 93, at
7. For a similar approach according to which the courts were to rule in
favor of providing remedy for the non-pecuniary damage suffered due to
the breach of the duty of disclosure, see, e.g., Foster, supra note 93, at
1645; Edward Levey, Taking the Scalpel to Compensation, L. SOC’Y
GAZETTE, Dec. 2, 2004, at 37. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the approach
I suggest is different, because it treats interference with the right to
autonomy as a separate head of damage and not as a derivation of nonpecuniary damages.
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remedy is to be awarded in cases of interference with the right
to autonomy (as opposed to injury to the interest of physical
security) and should not be subject to the realization of any
risk or proof of decision causation. The legal designation of
interference with the right to autonomy as a separate
compensable injury would convey indispensable normative
confirmation of this approach, which carries an important
message for patients as well as physicians.131
It is interesting to note that in the Chester decision, Lord
Hope, one of the judges in the majority, noted that recognition
of the duty to compensate a patient whose right to autonomy
was infringed has a powerful symbolic and galvanizing role in
the creation of a more substantive right to autonomy for
patients.132 However, the normative statement that eventually
emerged under the court’s aegis did not transmit the promised
symbolic message.

B. THIS RULE’S ADOPTION WILL INTRODUCE COHERENCE
Award of compensation to a patient for a physical injury
suffered in the absence of causation, together with
conditioning that compensation on the realization of a risk as
well as the establishment of decision causation, introduces
vertical as well as horizontal incoherence.133 That is, vertical
incoherence is created between the legal rules—the duty to ask
for the patient’s consent as well as the duty of disclosure—and
the theoretical basis of those rules, specifically, the patient’s
right to autonomy. Furthermore, internal (horizontal)
incoherence is introduced among the legal rules themselves by
131. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 665; Emily Jackson, ‘Informed
Consent’ to Medical Treatment and the Impotence of Tort, in FIRST DO NO
HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE 273, 284 (Shelia A.M. McLean ed.,
2006); Levit, supra note 30, at 174, 188–90.
132. Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 162–63
(U.K.).
133. According to coherence theories of law, the question of whether
the legal rule is coherent with former legal rules or legal principles is
relevant when dealing with the issue of validity or “correctness” of legal
rules or decisions. Furthermore, coherence considerations should be part
of legal reasoning because this is the best way to identify the correct legal
solution. There are different classifications of theories of coherence; one of
which differentiates between vertical coherence and horizontal coherence.
For a discussion on the nature of vertical coherence see, e.g., NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 106–07, 152 (1978); as
to horizontal coherence, see, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41–
42, 65–66 (rev. ed. 1969).
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inappropriately distinguishing between different defendants.
If the patient’s right to autonomy rests at the foundations
of a legal settlement, any interference with that right should
entitle the patient to compensation even if the risk inherent in
the respective treatment was not realized and the patient
suffered no physical injury. Moreover, compensation is due
even if the patient’s decision would not have been different had
there been no breach of the duty of disclosure. Interference
with the patient’s right to autonomy materializes with the
breach of the duty of disclosure, independent of any physical
injury or establishment of any other course of action. In
addition, if the patient’s right to autonomy rests at the
foundation of physicians’ basic duties to their patients, then
breach of those duties should entitle patients to compensation
for the interference itself rather than for the physical injury
caused by the medical treatment but not by the interference
with the right to autonomy.
Moreover, stipulating patient rights to compensation on
the realization of risk or proof of an alternative decision
introduces a distinction between plaintiffs who suffered a
physical injury and can prove the possibility of an alternative
decision, which entitles them to compensation, and plaintiffs
who did not suffer a physical injury or are unable to prove the
possibility of an alternate decision, and who are thus not
entitled to compensation. Such prejudice is inappropriate
when recognizing the fact that both experienced interference
with their right to autonomy and that the latter may have
suffered damage to her right, which is equal to if not more
severe than the damage suffered by the former.134
Recognition of the interference with the patient’s right to
autonomy as a distinct compensable injury, bounded neither
by the realization of risk nor evidence of decision causation,
mitigates incoherence by expressing the notion that the
patient’s right to compensation becomes palpable upon the
breach of any of the physician’s duties, and that the true
injury suffered by the patient in such cases is the interference
with her right to autonomy.135
134. Regarding the vertical incoherence created by the rule adopted in
the Chester decision, see JACKSON & POWELL ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
1013 (John L. Powell et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007).
135. ENGLARD, supra note 103, at 166; Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What
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It is interesting to note that the issue of horizontal
coherence was mentioned by Lord Hope, one of the judges in
the Chester case. The judge stated that the duty of disclosure
imposed on the defendant, resting as it does on the patient’s
right to autonomy, is unaffected by any decision the plaintiff
might have made had she received all the information about
the inherent risk.136 Considerations of vertical coherence can
also be found in the remainder of his opinion. According to
Justice Lord Hope, denial of compensation to patients who are
unable to candidly state that they would have definitely
refused the medical treatment and can only prove they would
have deferred the treatment in order to consult with other
professionals, represents discrimination.137 The duty to
transmit information about all the risks inherent in a
procedure to a patient who finds it difficult to make a decision
and would prefer to postpone treatment is identical to the duty
toward a patient capable of proving that she would refuse the
treatment at any time.138 Yet, despite the weight given to
considerations of coherence, the decision reflected a lack of
horizontal as well as vertical coherence.

C. ADOPTION OF THIS NEW RULE IS CONSISTENT WITH
CONSIDERATIONS OF DETERRENCE
Award of compensation to patients for physical injuries
suffered, despite the absence of causation between the
interference with their right to autonomy and the said injuries,
indicates application of a rule according to which physicians
are liable for all the harm suffered by patients in the wake of
medical treatment, including those injuries for which they are
not guilty. Alternatively, restricting a patient’s right to
compensation to those cases where they can establish physical
injury as a result of the physician’s breach of some duty
toward his patients indicates adoption of a rule relieving
physicians of liability in two situations: first, where the patient
did not suffer any physical injury as a result of the treatment;
We Should from Doctors: Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the DoctorPatient Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 235, 247 (2003); Joan H. Krause,
Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 364–65 (1999); Twerski & Cohen,
supra note 30, at 608, 616.
136. Chester, [2005] 1 A.C. at 154.
137. Id. at 162.
138. Id.
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second, where the patient suffered personal injury but was
unable to establish decision causation.
These rules do not accord with the aspiration to achieve
efficient deterrence. In order to do so, the economic burden
caused by harmful activity, which is to precisely equal the
social costs incurred due to that harmful activity, must be
internalized by the appropriate party.139 Put simply, a rule that
imposes social costs on a damager even if the respective costs
were not caused by his harmful activity is likely to initiate
over-deterrence.140 Alternatively, a rule that frees a damager of
liability in cases where his harmful activity incurred some
social cost can be expected to precipitate under-deterrence.141
It follows that a rule that allows imposition of liability on
physicians for the physical injuries suffered by their patients
as a result of medical treatment even in the absence of
causation between the interference with the right to autonomy
and those injuries, is expected to induce over-deterrence. And
the contrary: a rule that relieves doctors of liability in cases
where they breached one of their duties and thus interfered
with their patients right to autonomy, based on the grounds
that the patient did not suffer personal injury or is unable to
prove the “decision causation” can be expected to induce
under-deterrence.142
Recognition of interference with the right of autonomy as a
compensable injury is expected to prevent award of
compensation to patients, despite the absence of causation,143
at the same time that it will avoid conditioning entitlement to
compensation on the existence of physical injury or proof of
139. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 383–
84 (5th ed. 2008).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Damage to the doctrine’s effectiveness regarding deterrence is
expected to arise especially in cases where it is difficult to distinguish
between outcomes originating in medical treatment and outcomes
originating in the natural development of a disease, where the patient’s
medical condition requires treatment, and where the risk inherent in
alternative procedures is identical.
143. This argument is based on the assumption that if we recognize the
interference with the right to autonomy as a new head of damage, there
will no longer be any need to impose liability on the perpetrator of the
physical injury suffered by the patient despite the absence of causation in
order to assign normative relevance to the patient’s right to autonomy.
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decision causation. In other words, recognition of this new
head of damage increases the probability that the damager will
be obliged to pay the social costs of his harmful activity. It
follows that this approach is congruent with the interests of
deterrence.
It is interesting to note that in the Chester case, the court
thought it worthwhile to assign practical meaning and
relevance to the duties imposed on physicians as well as to the
patient’s right to autonomy. It was clear to them that
protecting such interests requires imposition of liability on the
defendant for the respective injuries.144 Although we may
initially interpret their statements as expressions of the court’s
aspiration to achieve deterrence, we soon realize that an
inefficient rule was nonetheless adopted.

D. ADOPTION OF THIS RULE COMPLIES WITH THE INTERESTS OF
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE145
One of the elements characterizing tort law in general and
corrective justice in particular is correlativity. Correlativity is
expressed, among other things, in the fact that the defendant’s
harmful actions caused injury to the plaintiff on the one hand,
and in the imposition of liability on the defendant to correct
the
damage
through
the
award
of
compensation
commensurate with the injury on the other hand.146
Considerations of corrective justice therefore demand that
if the equality between the parties—patient and physician—
was abrogated as a result of the physician’s harmful action,
the physician will be liable for the patient’s injury, expressed
as the interference with her right to autonomy. Adoption of a
rule imposing liability on the physician for the physical injuries
resulting from medical treatment but not from interference
with the patient’s right to autonomy or, alternatively, adoption
of a rule releasing the physician of liability for the injuries for
which he is culpable (interference with the patient’s right to
autonomy), contradicts the outcomes required by corrective
justice.
144. Chester v. Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 146, 150–
59, 162–63, 166 (U.K.).
145. For support of this argument, see Levit, supra note 30, at 189–90.
146. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 15, 26–27 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and
the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN
L. 107, 110, 116 (2001).
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As we have seen, considerations of justice, especially of
corrective justice, were major factors in the two decisions cited.
It was unthinkable to the courts that the defendants’ breach of
the duty of disclosure and interference with the plaintiffs’ right
to autonomy should have no legal response. Yet, despite the
correctness of these views, the decisions’ outcomes fully
contradicted the stated intentions. The interference with the
plaintiffs’ right to autonomy indeed justified a legal response
as expressed in the defendants’ liability but, contrary to the
rulings in the cases, not for the physical injuries suffered by
the plaintiffs as they were not in fact caused by the breach of
the duty of disclosure. A more appropriate application of the
principles of corrective justice would have required making the
defendants liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs’ right to
autonomy.

E. RECOGNITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO
AUTONOMY AS A COMPENSABLE DAMAGE COMPLIES WITH THE
LAW’S EVOLUTION
One of the central arguments upon which Shultz based
her thesis was the fact that provision of protection to the right
to autonomy, and thus the interest in choice, represents a
natural extension of developments in constitutional and civil
law.147 There is no need to repeat this argument, which was
extensively elaborated in her article. I would nevertheless like
to add to this reasoning.
Protection from interference with personal autonomy and
dignity underlines recent recognition of remedy for the misuse
of private information in the form of a new tort, that of
invasion of privacy in New Zealand,148 and as a further stage
in the development of breach of confidence in England.149
These recent developments reinforce the contention that
recognition of the right to autonomy as a separate interest, the
interference with which entitles the patient to compensation, is
to be found in common law. Moreover, if the law is prepared to
protect the right to autonomy with respect to the misuse of
private information, it is right and proper that the same
147. Shultz, supra note 1, at 276–81.
148. See Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 8 (C.A.).
149. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 464–
66 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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protection should be extended to instances where it is most
needed: cases of interference with the right of a person to
make an informed decision regarding the medical treatment
that she is to receive.
Despite the presence of these weighty reasons
supporting creation of the proposed new head of damage, one
cannot ignore two of the arguments raised against the
introduction of such a rule: the fear of over-deterrence and the
fear of incurring excessive administrative costs. Each will be
discussed separately.

1. The Fear of Over-deterrence
According to this argument, the legal rule recognizing
interference with the right to autonomy as a compensable
damage could motivate physicians to practice defensive
medicine. In other words, in the absence of the duty to
establish physical injury or decision causation, the scope of
medical liability is likely to expand, meaning that this legal
rule may instigate over-deterrence.
In-depth review of this argument leads, I believe, to the
conclusion that it is inadequate as justification for a rule that
would waive a physician’s liability for this damage.
First of all, the Chappel and Chester decisions indicate
that, surprisingly, we can expect adoption of this new head of
damage to prevent over-deterrence. As we have seen, the
courts in both cases awarded compensation to the plaintiffs for
their physical injuries, despite the absence of traditional
causation, because they felt that the interference with the right
to autonomy deserved a legal response.150 These decisions,
which allowed the imposition on the defendants of the social
costs (i.e., the patients’ physical injuries) not caused by the
defendants’ harmful activities (i.e., the breach of duty of
disclosure) can be expected to instigate over-deterrence.
Recognition of the new damage (i.e., interference with the right
to autonomy) will prevent such situations. The courts will now
be able to give direct normative expression of the importance of
the right to autonomy by awarding compensation to patients
for interference with that right without recourse to a substitute
in the guise of compensation for physical injury. Such a step
150. See Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 239, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html; Chester v.
Afshar, [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 A.C. 134, 146 (U.K.).
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will enable imposition of the true social costs of harmful
practices on the defendants and consequently facilitate
efficient deterrence.
Second, we should remember that not all additional
investments in precautionary measures by the damager
represent over-deterrence. Only those investments in means of
deterrence entailing costs beyond the expected loss represent
over-deterrence. Hence, the additional investments in
precautionary measures,151 to be anticipated in the wake of
recognition of the new head of damage, might not necessarily
reflect over-deterrence. On the contrary, considering the fact
that a rule that releases physicians of their liability for
interference with the patient’s rights to autonomy (due to the
absence of injury or decision causation) induces underdeterrence, the assignment of liability for that interference will
result in internalization of the social costs incurred by
physicians’ actions, a step likely to conclude in efficient
deterrence.
Third, even though creation of the new head of damage
is expected to enhance physicians’ liability and extend that
liability to cases where patients did not suffer any physical
injury or could not establish decision causation, the new rule
is not expected to magnify those duties flowing from the
doctrine
of
informed
consent.
Patients
requesting
compensation for interference with their right to autonomy will
still be forced to establish a breach of duty. It follows that the
rule’s effect on the scope of medical liability will thus be more
limited than anticipated. Consequently, as far as the
phenomenon of over-deterrence is linked to the scope of
liability that physicians themselves take into account, we can
conclude that recognition of this new head of damage as
compensable cannot be expected to dramatically intensify the
danger of over-deterrence.

2. The Fear of High Administrative Costs
This argument states that a legal rule recognizing

151. In the field of informed consent, additional investment in
precautionary measures will be expressed in additional time devoted to
disclosing information to patients, additional staff (i.e., social service
workers) interacting with patients, longer consent forms and additional
documentation of informed consent.
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interference with the right to autonomy as a compensable
damage will add to the population of injured parties claiming a
cause of action; the subsequent growth in the number of
petitions presented will overwhelm the courts and escalate the
accompanying administrative costs. But here, as well, detailed
examination of the argument leads to the conclusion that it is
insufficient to justify adoption of a contrary rule that releases
physicians of their liability for interference with this right.
First, in a large proportion of cases, the new rule will not
provide the plaintiff with a cause of action previously
unavailable. This will be the case in situations like the ones
dealt with in Chappel and Chester. The two decisions have
already expanded the population of plaintiffs by recognizing
entitlement to compensation even in cases where heavy doubt
remained regarding causation. Recognition of the new head of
damage, then, is not expected to further enlarge the number of
plaintiffs belonging to this category; rather, it will simply
enable more accurate depiction of the respective injury.
Second, victims’ presentation of claims represents an
essential feature of the tort’s internalization mechanism and
hence a precondition to the achievement of efficient
deterrence.152 The presentation of more claims, even if it
induces higher administrative costs, might then indicate the
need for just such an internalization mechanism and, it
follows, a necessary condition for achieving economic
efficiency.153 Here we should also mention that the contrary
rule releasing physicians of liability for interference with their
patient’s right to autonomy when physical injury or decision
causation are absent is expected to deter patients unable to
prove physical injury under such conditions from presenting
their claims. Even though the result is likely to be a reduction
in administrative costs, this contrary rule, because it inevitably
undermines the effect of deterrence embodied in the doctrine of
152. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192 (7th ed. 2007).
153. It is appropriate to recall here the approach taken by Calabresi,
stating that the desirable objective of tort law is the eventual reduction of
the total costs of accidents, not the prevention of specific types of costs.
Hence, if efficient deterrence can be achieved only by means of additional
administrative costs, and if such an act can be expected to reduce total
accidental costs, additional administrative costs do not represent a
negative but, rather, a necessarily positive phenomenon, one that is
commensurate with the interests of economic efficiency. See GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29–
30 (1970).
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informed consent, reduces economic efficiency. It follows that
the very recognition of this damage (i.e., interference with the
right to autonomy) as compensable may induce higher
administrative costs; however, it will, at the same time,
improve deterrence and thus reduce the number of cases of
interference with this right. In other words, the expected
administrative costs may be worthwhile and a more efficient
outcome from the perspective of accident costs may be
expected.
Third, as the literature shows, the rate of claims submitted
by patients suffering from medical negligence is low.154 This
finding, when added to the fact that the compensation awarded
for interference with the right to autonomy can be expected to
be lower than that awarded for physical injury, indicates that
the anxiety over inundation with claims and increasing
administrative costs may be unrealistic.155
Fourth, incentives favoring the presentation of claims can
be expected to be influenced not only by the proposed new
legal rule, but also by other legal rules associated with the
doctrine of informed consent. Thus, after adoption of the new
rule, patients requesting compensation will still face the
burden of providing proof of the said breach of duty. This task
is far from simple due to evidential difficulties as well as the
stipulations of the legal rules defining the physician’s duties. It
appears, then, that recognition of interference with the right of
autonomy as a compensable damage will not significantly
improve a plaintiff’s prospects for successful adjudication of
her claim. Hence, we can expect that the incentives
encouraging plaintiffs to present negligence claims against
physicians will continue to be limited by the informed consent
doctrine’s other rules.
Fifth, the previously mentioned incentives to present

154. See Edward A. Dauer, When the Law Gets in the Way: The
Dissonant Link of Deterrence and Compensation in the Law of Medical
Practice, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 293, 297 (2000) (citing HARVARD MEDICAL
PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 11-4
(1990)); Geoffrey C. Rapp, Doctors, Duties, Death and Data: A Critical
Review of the Empirical Literature on Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform,
26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 439, 449 (2006).
155. For support of this argument, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note
139, at 379–80.
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claims, and thus inflate administrative costs, can be
influenced with the appropriate rules. For instance, limiting
the amounts to be awarded for interference with the right to
autonomy is expected to dissuade patients whose sense of
injury to their right to autonomy is not sufficiently strong from
presenting their claims given the time and effort demanded for
managing legal proceedings.
The conclusion demanded from this discussion is,
therefore, that recognition of the new head of damage of
interference with the patient’s autonomy is the correct step to
take. Israel’s Supreme Court took that position in the
innovative Ali Daaka decision.156
156. CA 2781/93 Ali Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa [1999] IsrSC 53(4)
526. A comprehensive survey of decisions and the literature on English,
Australian, Canadian and American law indicates that in cases where the
claimed cause of action was absence of informed consent, the court did
not recognize interference with the right to autonomy as a compensable
tort. The courts ruled that the victim was entitled to compensation only if
she could establish that she had suffered physical injury as a result of a
breach of the declared duty. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 138–142 (2d ed. 2001);
HERRING, supra note 116, at 104; JACKSON, supra note 127, at 290;
Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to
“Patient Has Rights,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2000); Laurel R.
Hanson, Note, Informed Consent and the Scope of a Physician’s Duty of
Disclosure, 77 N. DAK. L. REV. 71, 76 (2001). Indeed, as we shall see, the
English House of Lords recognized interference with the right to autonomy
as a compensable damage in the Rees decision; however, the specific
incident dealt with a case of negligent sterilization and not a breach of
informed consent. Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003]
UKHL 52, [2004] 1 A.C. 309, 313, 349 (U.K), available at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/52.html. Therefore, the
Israeli Supreme Court is a pioneer in this respect. It is also important to
note that several decisions have adopted the approach that a patient is
entitled to compensation for the mental anguish suffered as a result of the
breach of the duty of informed consent even if she is unable to prove
physical injury as a result of the breach. However, the compensation was
awarded for tangible mental anguish (e.g., anxiety regarding future
personal injury or trauma as a result of disclosure), not for interference
with the patient’s right to autonomy. See, e.g., Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d
1012, 1020–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Jones v. Howard Univ., Inc., 589 A.2d
419, 422–25 (D.C. 1991); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337, 339 (Md.
1993); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559–62 (Minn. 1995); Snider v.
Henniger, [1992] 96 D.L.R. (4th) 367, 374–75 (Can.); Lachambre v. Nair,
[1989] 2 W.W.R. 749, 763 (Can.); Smith v. Barking, Havering and
Brentwood Health Authority, (1994) 5 Med. L.R. 285, 288, 291–292; Note,
Goorkani v. Tayside Health Board, 1991 S.L.T. 94, 95–96. Obviously, the
patient who bases her cause of action on the tort of assault can obtain
compensation even if she is unable to prove that she suffered physical
injury as a result of the interference with her right to autonomy. See
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V. THE ALI DAAKA DECISION
In this case, the patient, although hospitalized in order to
undergo surgery on her left leg, underwent surgery on her
right shoulder for the purpose of performing a biopsy given
fears of a malignancy. The decision to operate on her shoulder
was made by the attending physicians proximate to the
surgery. Hence, although the plaintiff had signed a consent
form regarding the surgery on her leg on the day of her
hospitalization, she was informed of the need to undergo a
procedure on her shoulder only on the day of the operation.
Her signature on the consent form regarding the latter
procedure was obtained while she was lying on the operating
table, under the influence of anesthetizing drugs, without
being informed about the risks inherent in the procedure. As a
result of the surgery the plaintiff suffered damage to her
shoulder. She filed a claim based on the tort of negligence
while arguing that she had not transmitted any valid consent
to the procedure.
The court ruled that acquisition of the plaintiff’s consent
under such circumstances, that is, without informing her of
the attendant risks, represented negligence on the part of the
defendants.157 Nevertheless, the judges in the majority were
convinced that the plaintiff had not proven causation between
the negligence and the consequent injury. It accordingly ruled
that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for the
physical injury suffered following the surgery on her
shoulder.158 After this decision was handed down, the court
addressed the question of whether it was possible to award the
plaintiff compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused
as a result of the defendants’ interference with her right to
autonomy. Following detailed, intensive discussion, the judges
Meisel, supra note 103, at 74–75. However, a patient can claim the tort of
assault only if she can substantiate that she did not consent to the
treatment or that no information was transmitted regarding the nature of
the treatment. See MICHAEL A. JONES, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 522 (3d ed.
2003); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782–83 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 10–11 (Can.); Rogers v.
Whitaker, [1992] 175 C.L.R. 479, 490 (Can.). Moreover, in the absence of
tangible injury, the patient will be awarded nominal damages rather than
compensatory damages. See HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES
360 (17th ed. 2003).
157. Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) at 550, 563, 587.
158. Id. at 564–70.
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A. INTERFERENCE WITH A PATIENT’S RIGHT TO AUTONOMY CAN BE
DEFINED AS A “DAMAGE” ACCORDING TO THE TORT ACT
This statement demands clarification. In Israeli law, the
tort of negligence is elaborated in the Civil Wrongs
Ordinance.160 In Israeli law, the foundations of this tort are
identical to those in Anglo-American law, and require existence
of some damage.161 Accordingly, in order for the plaintiff to
claim the tort of negligence, she must prove that the injury
represents “damage” as defined in the Civil Wrongs Ordinance,
paragraph two, that is: “loss of life, or loss of, or detriment to,
any property, comfort, bodily welfare, reputation or other
similar loss or detriment.”162 The court in Ali Daaka ruled that
injury to one’s feelings as a result of interference with her
basic right to autonomy constitutes an injury to her well-being
and thus represents “damage” as defined in the Ordinance.163

B. RECOGNITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHT TO
AUTONOMY AS A COMPENSABLE DAMAGE IS COMPATIBLE WITH
LEGAL POLICY
Influenced by its awareness that a person’s right to
autonomy is an elemental component of the Israeli legal
system as well as the fact that exercise of this right has special
significance in the context of medical treatment, the court
ruled that not only should physicians anticipate the damage
associated with that right’s interference as a factual issue, they
should also anticipate it as a matter of legal policy. The court
mentioned four fundamental considerations to support its
conclusion. First, the existence of trust and close ties between
patient and doctor, in addition to the patient being in the first
circle of risk, indicates proximity between those providing
treatment and the patient.164 Second, given that the physician
enjoys an absolute advantage over the patient with respect to
the pertinent knowledge, and given his ability to take the
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 581, 616.
Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 1972, 2 LSI(NV) 5 (Isr.).
Id. at 6.
Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 1972, 2 LSI(NV) at 5.
Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) at 574–75.
Id. at 576.
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measures necessary to prevent interference with the patient’s
right to autonomy, it appears that the physician is in a
superior position to prevent the respective damage.
Recognition of this injury as compensable is therefore likely to
contribute to the prevention of the stated damage and thus is
justified.165 Third, provision of treatment without the patient’s
informed consent represents a breach of the physician’s
contractual duty to act in a skilled and reasonable manner
when providing treatment.
The patient is therefore entitled to enjoy the right to
compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused by that
breach, which is similar in nature to the damage caused by
interference with a patient’s right to autonomy. The aspiration
not to inappropriately distinguish between contractual claims
and tort claims thus justifies recognition of the respective
injury as compensable within the framework of tort law.166
Finally, acceptance of the argument that the patient has a
right to select the medical treatment most suitable for her
requires determination of a “price” to be attached to the injury
to her dignity, expressed in the performance of medical
procedures without first obtaining her informed consent.167

C. THE STANDARD ARGUMENTS RAISED AGAINST RECOGNITION OF
THIS NEW HEAD OF DAMAGE—SUCH AS THE ANXIETY REGARDING
“MEDICAL DEFENSIVENESS,” THE FEAR OF HIGH ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS AND THE ABSENCE OF AN INJURY APPROPRIATE FOR
COMPENSATION—DO NOT JUSTIFY NEGATION OF THE INJURED
PARTY’S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR INTERFERENCE WITH HER
RIGHT TO AUTONOMY168
Further to its conclusion that interference with the right to
autonomy represents a compensable damage, the court in this
case expressed its opinion that this category of compensation
is not to be treated as a proxy for compensation for the
physical injury suffered due to the said interference. The
damage to the patient’s right to autonomy, it reiterated, is
separate and distinct from the damage of physical injury,
compensation for which is supplemental to the compensation
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 576–77.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 581.
See id. at 577–79.

KARAKO-EYAL N. Has Non-U.S. Case Law Recognized a Legally Protected Autonomy
Right? MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 671-726.

2009]

LEGALLY PROTECTED AUTONOMY RIGHT

711

awarded for the patient’s physical injury.169
These considerations led the court to conclude that the
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary
outcomes of the interference with her right to autonomy. After
evaluating the damage incurred, it awarded her compensation
of NIS 15,000.170

VI. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ALI DAAKA DECISION
AND THE PROPOSED NEW APPROACH
There is no doubt that the Ali Daaka ruling quite
considerably meets the requirements of Shultz’s vision,
although careful review of the decision indicates that some
gaps remain. This conclusion flows from an analysis of the
principles determined with respect to how compensation for
the new damage of interference with the right to autonomy is
to be assessed.
The crux of the approach adopted by the court is that the
compensation is to be assessed according to the nonpecuniary-subjective-tangible outcomes of the interference
with the patient’s right to autonomy. That is, according to the
degree to which her feelings and sensitivities were wounded171
(hereinafter, the subjective approach).
In assessing compensation for the wounding of the
patient’s feelings and sensitivities as a result of interference
with her right to autonomy, the following factors must be
considered. How severe is the breach of informed consent?172
For example, the more meaningful the information not
transmitted to the patient, the greater the severity of the
interference with her right to autonomy, hence, the larger is
the compensation to be awarded.173 How important is the
decision to the patient? As the decision’s importance grows, so
does the interference with her participation in decision making
169. Id. at 581–82, 618.
170. An amount valued at about $4,500. (This amount was calculated
based on the current exchange rate, which is about NIS 4.2 to $1) The Ali
Daaka ruling has been implemented by Israeli courts in numerous
decisions since it was handed down. Review of the decisions indicates that
in the majority of cases, the amount of the compensation ranged between
NIS 15,000 and NIS 50,000, that is, between about $4,500 and about
$15,000.
171. Ali Daaka, [1999] IsrSC 53(4) at 583–84, 618–19, 621, 623.
172. Id. at 583, 620.
173. Id. at 583.
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and, consequently, so does the damage to her right to
autonomy. The likelihood that she will be entitled to greater
compensation increases in tandem.174
What is the effect of the interference on the patient’s
decision? If the information not transmitted might have
changed her attitude regarding the medical treatment, we can
assume that the damage was greater and that she will be
entitled to more compensation.175 What is the patient’s
attitude toward transmission of medical information? That is,
if the patient delegated decision-making to the physician and
requested no details about her medical condition, we can
assume that she suffered no harm from the interference.176
What were the results of the treatment? For instance, the fact
that the treatment succeeded even though it was performed
without the patient’s informed consent is likely to reduce the
compensation considerably.177
The foregoing list is only partial.178 The court also added
general guidelines, advocating that the courts adopt a
balanced attitude. On the one hand, the court was requested
to recall that the cause of action entailed damage to a basic
right and thus demanded determination of appropriate as
opposed to symbolic compensation. On the other hand, the
court was to restrain itself and avoid the award of exaggerated
compensation.179
Finally, it is interesting to note that even though the court
adopted the approach entailing assessment of compensation
according to the non-pecuniary-subjective-tangible outcomes
of the interference with the patient’s right to autonomy, it also
deemed it appropriate to disengage that compensation from
dependence on the patient’s submission of detailed evidence
regarding the extent of damage suffered. In such cases of
general injury, the court was likely to award, under the
appropriate circumstances, some pecuniary compensation
even in the absence of detailed proof of tangible harm. The
underlying reasoning for this statement is that the existence

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

620.
620–21.
621.
583.
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and severity of the injury was due to the very interference with
the patient’s right to autonomy; hence, the court is able to
assess compensation after considering all the known factors of
the case.180
Several conclusions can be deduced from the principles
adopted by the court. First, to award compensation, there
must be proof of subjective and tangible outcomes—such as
wounded feelings—subsequent to the interference with the
patient’s right to autonomy. Closely related is denial of the
victim’s right to compensation from the damagers if, for one
reason or another, the victim is unaware of this interference
and is therefore unable to feel the emotional consequences of
the injury. Included in this category are persons who died
during medical treatment, or immediately afterwards, without
learning that they had suffered interference with their right to
autonomy; persons who remained unconscious following
treatment and are not expected to regain consciousness and
who are therefore unaware of the interference or exhibit no
emotional responses such as sorrow or mental anguish in its
wake; and persons who, as a result of medical treatment, have
suffered cognitive loss and are unaware of their surroundings.
Patients of this type are not entitled to compensation for the
interference with their right to autonomy even though the
interference with their right is likely to be equal or perhaps
greater in severity than that suffered by patients who are able
to feel its outcomes.
Second, application of this approach is expected to
conclude in award of considerably low compensation,
particularly in two types of cases: cases in which the medical
treatment succeeded and did not cause the patient any
physical injury;181 and cases where decision causation cannot
be proved.182 We are able to assume in these two instances,
given the absence of other evidence, that the patient’s feelings
were only mildly wounded, either because the treatment
succeeded and the patient suffered no physical injury, or
because the patient would not have made a different decision
even in the absence of any interference with her right to
autonomy.
It follows that the approach adopted by the court is likely
180. Id. at 583.
181. Id. at 621.
182. Id. at 620.
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to culminate in the award of low compensation in exactly those
cases where the new head of damage is most pertinent, that is,
cases where the plaintiffs cannot prove physical injury or
decision causation. This, indeed, describes the circumstances
in the Ali Daaka case, where the court ruled that decision
causation had not been substantiated. The compensation
awarded to the plaintiff was a mere NIS 15,000 despite the fact
that her right to autonomy had been most grossly interfered
with.
The court failed to fully grant sufficient weight to the
patient’s right to autonomy. It is difficult to deny that the
amount of compensation awarded to the plaintiff reflects the
importance society attaches to the interest damaged.183 Denial
of the right to compensation for interference with a patient’s
right to autonomy or the award of meager compensation for
that interference, despite the extreme interference suffered,
does not accord with the idea that the right to autonomy is an
interest to be protected.
Nor does the ruling in the Ali Daaka case accord with
considerations of deterrence or corrective justice. These
require, as we have seen, a stipulation declaring that the
perpetrator is to be charged for the damage he caused.
Whoever interferes with a patient’s right to autonomy is to
carry the social cost of the harm, whether or not the patient is
aware of the outcomes of the interference, whether or not she
suffered physical injury, and whether or not she can or cannot
prove decision causation.
Finally, the subjective approach does not abide by
standards of coherence. Not only does it not comply with the
patient’s right to autonomy and thus creates horizontal
incoherence, it also introduces an inappropriate distinction
between victims based on the level of their awareness
regarding the interference with their right to autonomy in
addition to their ability to provide evidence of tangible injury as
well as decision causation.184 By following that path, the
183. Donna Benedek, Non-Pecuniary Damages: Defined, Assessed and
Capped, 32 REVUE JURIDQUE THEMIS 607, 615 (1998).
184. Concurrently, an inappropriate distinction will be made between
perpetrators.
Thus, for example, a distinction will arise between
perpetrators whose victims are able to feel the non-pecuniary injury
subsequent to the interference with their right to autonomy, and who are
thus obligated to compensate those victims, and perpetrators whose
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subjective approach is shown to also create vertical
incoherence.185
How can we explain the court’s failure to fully implement
the Shultz vision in the Ali Daaka case? Similar to the Chappel
and Chester cases, the Israeli court’s decision in Ali Daaka was
influenced by the approach stating that a patient who suffered
from interference with her right to autonomy is to be awarded
compensation only if she suffered tangible injuries. Although
the court in Ali Daaka was prepared to compensate the
plaintiff for the very fact of the interference with her right to
autonomy, it demanded that the plaintiff establish a tangible
injury in the form of wounded feelings. Adoption of this
approach, which specifies that compensation be awarded only
to patients suffering tangible damage, is related, as we have
seen, to the use of the tort of negligence as a cause of action.
An examination of the shortcomings of the approach
adopted in the Ali Daaka case raises the question of which
approach the court should have adopted. Shultz contends
that in cases of this type—that is, cases where the plaintiff is
unable to prove that she suffered personal injury as a result of
the interference with her right to autonomy—the court should
award her compensation in the form of a global amount whose
value is to be determined according to one of two criteria:
either a fixed amount above a nominal sum or an amount
determined by the jury in consideration of all the
circumstances of the case.186 Nevertheless, it is difficult to
derive a comprehensive theory of compensation from Shultz’s
position. I will now attempt to present such a theory.
I believe that the court should have adopted an objectiveproprietary approach regarding the damage from interference
with the patient’s right to autonomy.
According to this
approach, a victim’s life, her physical integrity, her ability to
enjoy the amenities of living, her freedom from pain and

victims are unable to do so and are thus free of the same obligation. This
distinction is inappropriate when considering the possibility that the two
perpetrators caused identical damage in the nature and severity of their
interference, performed the same actions and committed the same
omissions. It follows that this approach introduces dual incoherence.
185. For an argument similar in spirit against the personal-subjective
approach, see Kyle R. Crowe, The Semantical Bifurcation of Noneconomic
Loss: Should Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and
Suffering Damage?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1290–91 (1990).
186. Shultz, supra note 1, at 290–91 & n.13.
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suffering, and thus her right to autonomy, are all personal
properties having value, like a home and its chattel. To deny a
patient “property” of this sort implies denial of something for
which she enjoys “proprietary rights.” Each such “property”
has a “value” that requires compensation for its loss or
damage, even if the victim is subjectively unaware of the
damage and its outcomes, and even if she feels no pain or
suffering in the injury’s wake.187
When following this approach, compensation is assessed
by determining the value of the right of autonomy as an
amount expressing the right’s objective value to society on the
one hand, and ascertaining the magnitude of the interference
with that right on the other.188 The magnitude of the
interference with the right to autonomy is assessed according
to all the circumstances of the case,189 including the type and
scope of information kept from the patient,190 the importance
of the decision to the patient,191 and the number as well as
characteristics of available alternative treatments.192 In
contrast, the intensity of the wounded feelings felt by the
patient because of the interference with her right to autonomy
will not be considered a contributing factor and will thus be
excluded from the compensation assessment. At the same
time, I do not deny the possibility of awarding the patient
additional compensation for her mental anguish. However, the
187. Comment, Nonpecuniary Damages for Comatose Tort Victims, 61
GEO. L.J. 1547, 1548–49 (1973); Benedek, supra note 183, at 619–20;
Graeme Mew, Damages—Personal Injuries—Non-Pecuniary Damages—
Unaware Plaintiff and the Functional Approach, 64 CAN. BAR REV. 562,
563–64 (1986); A.I. Ogus, Damages for Lost Amenities: For a Foot, a
Feeling or a Function?, 35 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972).
188. The value of the right of autonomy to society will obviously be
identical in every case coming before the court. Differences in the
compensation awarded will be determined by the distinctive
circumstances of the injury.
189. See Ogus, supra note 187, at 2–3.
190. Thus, the greater the amount of information denied the patient
and the more relevant that information to making a decision, the more
severe the interference with the patient’s right to autonomy.
191. That is, the more important the decision is to the patient and the
greater the expectation that its implications will be meaningful to her, the
more severe the interference with her right to autonomy.
192. On the approach stating that the greater the number of alternative
treatments available to the patient and the greater the difference between
those alternatives, the greater the interference with the patient’s right to
autonomy, see Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at 658–59.
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award of compensation to the plaintiff should not depend on
the establishment of tangible-subjective damage.
In determining the “objective” value of the right to
autonomy, the court should be swayed by that right’s
centrality in law and in society. That is, the court is to
recognize this right as having more than symbolic value. It
thus means that the type of compensation suggested by this
approach is to be neither symbolic nor nominal, as is
compensation for the tort of assault, but the compensation
should still be fitting.193 At the same time, the courts should
abstain from being excessive in the amounts awarded.194 The
purpose of recognizing the new head of damage is not to
“punish” the perpetrator.
We should therefore avoid
enshrouding compensation with an aura of “retribution,” an
act that might eventually induce over-deterrence.195
Adoption of this approach can be supported on several
grounds. First, as stated, it resists the assessment of
compensation at a level commensurate with the patient’s
wounded feelings. Hence, application of this approach is not
expected to deny the right to compensation to victims who, for
whatever reason, are unable to sense distress or mental
anguish as a result of the interference with their right to
autonomy.
Second, because compensation will not be assessed
according to the non-pecuniary outcomes of the interference
with the right to autonomy, we can expect less weight to be
given to factors such as the treatment’s successful outcomes
and whether the plaintiff was able to prove decision causation.
Adoption of this approach can therefore be expected to prevent
the award of low compensation to victims only because the
treatment was occasionally successful or because it was
assumed that the patient would have agreed to undergo that
treatment in any case.

193. I therefore reject the approach implied by Justice Hoffman in the
Chester decision, according to which the plaintiff is to be awarded a
meager sum for the interference with the right to autonomy. See supra
note 104.
194. As we have seen, this approach was adopted by the Court in the
Ali Daaka case. See CA 2781/93 Ali Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa [1999]
IsrSC 53(4) 526, 583.
195. Were we to attempt to translate these principles into tangible
amounts, the minimal sum would be NIS 50,000 (about $15,000) and the
maximum NIS 300,000 (about $80,000).
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Third, given that this approach is based on objective
criteria, it minimizes the difficulties attached to the
assessment of compensation raised by the approaches based
on estimating the damage to the victim’s well-being.196 The
accompanying administrative costs will therefore be much
lower.
Fourth, because the amount of compensation to be
awarded will be fitting as opposed to symbolic, this approach is
expected to provide appropriate incentives for the presentation
of claims involving interference with the right to autonomy
even if this was the sole injury the patient suffered.
Fifth, the objective approach is not foreign to AngloAmerican law; it has been recognized with respect to such nonpecuniary damages as loss of the amenities of life and of
bereavement.197
After examining the attributes of the objective-proprietary
approach, I should note that I am not ignoring a potential
criticism, specifically, the difficulty of assessing compensation
within its framework. The source of this difficulty lies in the
nature of the respective “property,” the patient’s right to
autonomy, which has no market value. In addition, in the
absence of any other standard for determining the value of this
property and the degree of harm suffered, we can anticipate
that compensation will be awarded in arbitrary amounts.
Even though this is clearly a substantive argument, it
remains insufficient to justify rejection of the proposed
approach because similar difficulties arise when applying the
subjective approach. According to the subjective approach,
the court is to assess the degree of damage inflicted on the
victim’s well-being as a result of the negligence in question in
addition to quantifying the pecuniary worth of that damage. In
the case of interference with a patient’s right to autonomy, the
court is required to assess the non-pecuniary-subjective
outcome of the injury in the form of wounded feelings as well
as assigning them a value. This task is particularly complex
due to the absence of objective standards for measuring the

196. This difficulty is inherent in the personal-subjective approach.
See Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and
the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 178–79 (2004); Comment,
supra note 187, at 1553.
197. See. e.g., DEAKIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 1002, 1004.
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said damage, that is, we lack objective standards for assessing
how much well-being was lost as a result of the negligent
action and for quantifying the pecuniary worth of that loss.198
Considerable arbitrariness will therefore characterize the
compensation assessment from the subjective approach as
well.199 It follows that the consideration of arbitrariness, in
itself, cannot justify rejection of the objective approach. The
choice between the subjective approach and the objective
approach should, therefore, rest on other considerations as
discussed previously. As I have shown, these considerations
lead to the conclusion that the objective approach is the
desirable one.
In concluding this section I would like to devote a few
words to the possibility of assessing compensation according to
the theory of loss of chance. As we have seen, this theory was
rejected in the form presented by the plaintiff in the Chappel
case.200 We have also seen that this theory can be interpreted
to allow the award of compensation for the very interference
with the patient’s right to autonomy by presenting the chance
lost as the probability of the victim making a decision that
reflects her true wishes and values. If this interpretation is
correct, why do I reject this theory and retain my preference for
the objective-proprietary approach?
My position rests on the Chappel decision, which
illustrates the problems of applying the theory of loss of
chance.
This theory invites the jurist to evaluate the
probability of events transpiring differently from the actual
events. Such a request risks shifting attention away from the
interference with the right to autonomy to the lost chance of
receiving treatment different from that given to the plaintiff
and to outcomes different from those suffered.
As stated, the Chappel decision faithfully demonstrates
these issues. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s injury
was actually the lost chance of the surgery being performed
later and by a different surgeon.201 He would later argue that
198. See King, Jr., supra note 196; Comment, supra note 187, at 1553.
199. Regarding the arbitrariness inherent in the evaluation of
compensation for non-pecuniary damages suffered by the victim, see
PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 162, 167
(7th ed. 2006); King, Jr., supra note 196, at 179–80.
200. Chappel v. Hart (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 236, 278, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/55.html.
201. Id. at 237–38.
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due to the fact that the risk inherent in the procedure was
identical irrespective of the date of the surgery and the identity
of the surgeon, the chance lost by the plaintiff would be of
minimal value.202 Clearly, the defendant had ignored the fact
that the plaintiff had lost the prospect of making a decision
that reflected her desire to postpone the surgery, to select a
different surgeon, and to consider the very desirability of
performing the surgery at that time, a prospect having value in
isolation of the risks inherent in each of the options before her.
Adoption of the objective-proprietary approach avoids such a
difficulty because it perceives the right to autonomy per se as
property, and thus as having independent worth.
An additional problem with the theory of loss of chance is
the fact that it requires assessment of the of the victim’s lost
chance. If the damage suffered is treated as the loss of the
victim’s chance of making a decision that reflects her values
and wishes, this approach raises the question of what
proportion of this chance was indeed lost. This question
cannot be answered until responses are received regarding two
other questions. First, what is the probability that the patient’s
decision would reflect her values and wishes had there not
been a breach of disclosure? Second, to what degree did the
breach of the duty of disclosure affect this probability? Given
that a large number of factors are likely to influence the
patient’s decision, and given that some of them might
contribute to a situation where the patient’s decision might not
reflect her values and wishes irrespective of any breach of the
duty of disclosure, providing an answer to this question is an
intricate if not impossible mission. This intricacy represents a
further consideration supporting adoption of the objectiveproprietary approach to the assessment of compensation.

VII. REES V. DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL NHS
TRUST—IS THIS WHAT WE HAD HOPED FOR?
The Rees decision is not a case of informed consent.203 Its
subject is a negligent case of sterilization that concluded in the

202. Id.
203. Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL 52,
[2004]
1
A.C.
309,
309
(U.K),
available
at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/52.html.
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birth of a healthy baby.204 Nevertheless, the decision handed
down by the House of Lords has implications for the current
discussion.
The plaintiff in the Rees case suffered from serious
health problems.205 Because she felt she would be unable to
care for a child properly, she requested sterilization.206 She
subsequently turned to a physician who was employed by the
defendant while making clear her decision not to conceive.207
The sterilization was imperfectly performed; the plaintiff later
became pregnant and gave birth to a normal, healthy child.208
She then filed a petition for remuneration for the cost of
raising a child given her special circumstances. The House of
Lords, in a majority of four to three, ruled that the plaintiff
should not be awarded compensation for the full cost of raising
her unplanned child,209 although they did award her a
conventional sum of £15,000.210
The judges in the majority were convinced that the
fairness of a rule that denies a plaintiff, the victim of a legal
tort, any compensation exclusive of remuneration of the costs
incurred by pregnancy and birth is doubtful.211 The court
believed they should not ignore the real damage caused the
parents, especially the mother, under these circumstances.
Due to another’s negligence, she was denied the opportunity to
live the life that she wanted and had chosen.212 The plaintiff,
they continued, had suffered damage to a meaningful aspect of
her right to autonomy—the right to plan and limit the size of
her family.213 This right is a significant human right, one that
requires legal protection in the form of compensation for the
unique interference with the mother’s right to autonomy. The
House of Lords supported the approach proposed by Lord
Millet in Mcfarlane v. Tayside Health Board,214 according to
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 316, 319, 348–49, 354–55.
210. Id. at 356.
211. Id. at 316–17.
212. Id. at 317.
213. Id. at 317, 319, 349, 356.
214. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board, [2000] 2 A.C. 59, 114 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
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which a conventional sum should be awarded to plaintiffs in
such cases.215 The amount of compensation set in Rees, the
stated £15,000,216 was not the product of calculation and was
not compensatory, the court stressed; its purpose was to
express the tort suffered by the plaintiff and the interference
with her right to autonomy.217
As stated, the Rees decision does not involve a breach of
the duty of informed consent; rather, it is a case of medical
malpractice. Moreover, we can explain the court’s decision by
referring to the exceptional, convoluted issue at hand—award
of compensation to parents for the cost of raising a healthy
child. Nevertheless, the decision does provide important
support for my thesis. First, the House of Lords accepted the
idea that interference with a person’s right to autonomy
represents a separate damage that entitles the injured party to
compensation even in the absence of tangible damage. Second,
by
adopting
the
objective
approach
for
assessing
compensation, the House rejected the subjective approach
taken by the court in the Ali Daaka case. As conceptualized in
Rees, compensation expressed the injustice done to the victim,
not to her feelings.
In consideration of the fact that a person’s right to
autonomy plays a crucial role in the context of medical
treatment, the decision in the Rees case is likely to persuade
other courts to recognize interference with the right to
autonomy as a compensable damage in the context of the
doctrine of informed consent.
Nevertheless, one significant feature does separate the
approach adopted in the Rees case and my own. As we have
seen, the amount of compensation to be awarded when
applying the objective-proprietary approach is expected to
fluctuate in conjunction with the unique circumstances of
each case of interference. Yet, in Rees, the House of Lords
adopted a tariff approach. In contrast to the objectiveproprietary approach that assigns a monetary value to the
victim’s loss based on the particular circumstances of the case,
215. Rees, [2004] 1 A.C. at 317 (citing McFarlane, [2000] 2 A.C. at 114).
216. This award is higher than that offered by Lord Millet in the
McFarlane decision, which amounted to only £5,000, based on the
argument that expression should be given to the wrong done as well as to
achieve some degree of justice. Id.
217. Rees, [2004] 1 A.C. at 316–37, 319, 349–50, 356.
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the tariff approach assigns a uniform and permanent monetary
value to all instances of interference.218 Accordingly, a
standard “price,” known in advance, is to be attached to this
interference, making it unnecessary for the court to make a
case-by-case determination of the correct damage or its
outcomes.219
It therefore appears that while we can expect these two
approaches to prevent the difficulties inherent in the subjective
approach (i.e., the unjustified denial of compensation to
selected types of victims and the award of small amounts of
compensation in cases where the victim did not suffer tangible
damage or is unable to prove decision causation), they remain
distinct in everything touching upon assessment of the
compensation. The question remaining before us pertains to
which of these approaches is preferable in cases of interference
with the right to autonomy.
The advantage of the tariff approach is embodied in its
simplicity. When following this approach, the court is not
required to determine the severity of the interference.
Compensation is limited to awards in stipulated amounts.
Hence, the tariff approach has two major advantages: first,
lower administrative costs;220 second, certainty regarding the
anticipated amount of compensation. Due to this certainty,
one can expect a rise in the number of compromises and thus
a reduction in the number of petitions and, eventually,
administrative cost savings.221
Despite these advantages, I believe it unwarranted to
prefer the tariff approach to the objective-proprietary approach
when determining compensation in the wake of interference
with the right to autonomy. As some of the judges party to the
Rees decision noted, the tariff approach is quite arbitrary.222
Its application is likely to conclude in the award of an
invariable amount of compensation, as stipulated by law, to all
victims, without differentiating between the circumstances or
the severity of the interference.
218. See Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy
Compromise With Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 763 (1986).
219. Id. For an argument that this approach influenced the judges in
the Chappel case, see Waddams, supra note 93, at 7.
220. See Ogus, supra note 187, at 12–13.
221. See CANE, supra note 199, at 167; King, Jr. supra note 196, at
196–97; Waddams, supra note 93, at 7–8.
222. Rees, [2004] 1 A.C. at 319, 335.
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Given that, several disadvantages can be attributed to the
tariff approach. To begin with, perpetrators will be charged
with compensating victims in amounts either above or below
the value of the actual damage they caused, practices that are
likely to induce over- or under-deterrence. In addition, because
some victims will be awarded compensation above the value of
the damage they suffered and others compensation below that
value, this approach’s application is expected to distort the
incentives encouraging patients to file for damages. That is,
some patients will be dissuaded from filling petitions by
inadequate incentives, whereas others will be stimulated by
exaggerated incentives, with the attendant implications of
under- or over-deterrence and rising administrative costs.
Lastly, this approach does not accord with considerations of
corrective justice, which require charging the perpetrator for
compensation that accurately reflects the harm caused.
The objective-proprietary approach therefore remains the
preferable approach. No doubt this approach is characterized
by some degree of arbitrariness as well because the respective
“property” is the “patient’s right to autonomy,” a good lacking
any market value. And so, in the absence of any other
standard for evaluating this property and the amount of
damage done, we can expect the compensation awarded to be
arbitrary, with all the negative implications. Yet, because this
approach encourages consideration of the circumstances of the
interference and the degree of damage done, this approach
better equips us to express the severity of the interference
while differentiating between diverse victims and perpetrators.
The comparative level of inherent arbitrariness appears, then,
to be lower.

VIII. THE THESIS – SUMMARY
Now, after traveling the long road that began with Shultz’s
excellent article and ended with a review of the innovative
decision handed down by the House of Lords in the Rees case,
I can summarize the main points of my thesis.
First, the law should recognize a new head of damage of
interference with the right to autonomy. Under this heading, a
patient who has suffered interference with her right to
autonomy will be eligible for compensation regardless of
whether she suffered a physical injury as a result of medical
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treatment and whether she can establish decision causation.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this new head of damage to
prevent such a plaintiff from also receiving compensation for
the tangible injuries she suffered. In other words,
compensation for interference with the right to autonomy will
not replace compensation for physical injury suffered by the
victim as a result of that interference; it can only supplement
it.223
Second, assessment of the amount of compensation to be
awarded for the damage of interference with right to autonomy
is to be conducted according to the objective-propriety
approach. Assessment of compensation is therefore to be
based on the damage suffered to the victim’s “property” (i.e.,
her right to autonomy), rather than any injured feelings.
Entitlement to compensation is thus independent of the
plaintiff’s awareness of the interference with this right.
Treatment success and absence of decision causation
represent only two of a set of factors to be considered by the
court when assigning the amount of compensation to be
awarded. Furthermore, the amount of compensation will be
determined according to the value of the right to autonomy on
the one hand, and the circumstances of the said interference
on the other, a strategy that will introduce variety in the
amount of compensation to be awarded in each case. The
principle guiding this assessment of compensation would be
assignment of an appropriate rather than a symbolic amount.
Third, legislation should make available a new and
independent cause of action for patients claiming interference
with their right to autonomy. This cause of action can be
attached to standing legislation dealing with patients’ rights or

223. As we have seen, this is the position taken by the court in the Ali
Daaka case. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. I adopt the
same position. The question of whether we should limit the patient’s right
to compensation to the damage of interference with his right to autonomy,
or compensate her for the physical injuries she suffered as well, goes
beyond the scope of this article because it raises issues different from
those discussed here. I will limit myself to noting that some scholars are
convinced that in the majority of cases exhibiting the absence of informed
consent, the patient should not receive compensation for the physical
injury suffered as a result of interference with her right to autonomy and
that we should limit the right to compensation to the damage of
interference with that right. See, e.g., Twerski & Cohen, supra note 30, at
609, 648, 662; Jackson, supra note 131.
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introduced into legislation dealing with physicians’ liability; on
the basis of such laws, patients will be able to obtain
compensation for any of the injuries suffered or for all of them,
i.e., the interference with the right to autonomy as well as the
other tangible injuries suffered as a result.
It is important to note that the Rees decision indicates the
possibility of introducing rules such as I have suggested
regarding the damage of interference with the right to
autonomy and its compensation under the heading of the tort
of negligence. Although such steps are possible, they require
awareness of the necessity and willingness to distance
ourselves from the characteristics of the tort of negligence and
its traditional role with respect to claims of medical
malpractice. However, it is doubtful whether the courts are
amenable to doing so, or are even aware of the need to do so.
These constraints are indicated by the fact that even in the
Chester decision, handed down after the Rees decision, the
House of Lords made little use of the solution offered in the
Rees decision. The court in the Chester decision could have
followed the Rees decision and ruled that the plaintiff was not
entitled to compensation for the physical injury she had
suffered in the absence of causation, but that she was entitled
to compensation for the interference with her right to
autonomy. As we have seen, the court did not follow this path
but focused, for reasons described previously, solely on the
physical injury suffered.
It appears, then, that the legal approach most appropriate
is creation of a new and independent legal framework for the
protection of patients’ right to autonomy.
The Shultz’s article, together with the Chappel, Chester, Ali
Daaka and Rees decisions, represent important milestones in
the development of the doctrine of informed consent, and the
recognition of the right to autonomy as an independent
interest having legal salience. Nevertheless, despite the long
road traveled by the law, it has still not reached its destination.
My proposal represents, I am convinced, an important step
toward completion of this journey.

